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THE DEVOLUTION OF NEPA: How TiE APA




The slow development of case law on the subject of man's
right to live in quality surroundings is unfortunate. No
matter how good the intentions, actions, and end products
of legislative bodies, those bodies cannot legislate on all
matters essential to environmental quality. At best, they
can state the goals of society with respect to the type of
environment we want for ourselves and future genera-
tions, and enact policies which appear to maximize the
likelihood that those goals will be attained. But there will
always be many specific fact situations which the legisla-
tive bodies do not anticipate or deal with; in those situa-
tions the public interest should not be ignored merely
because the situations were not foreseen.'
As the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")
approaches its fortieth anniversary,2 it seems only fitting-in a world
standing on the precipice of various environmental crises, ranging from
climate change to the dramatic depletion of marine resources-to reflect
on the past and potential future of NEPA. Shortly after Congress passed
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Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law, 2007-2008; member, Van
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the law faculty at Florida State University College of Law, and in particular the
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thank the editorial board of the William & Mary Environmental Law & Policy Review,
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'Henry M. Jackson, Foreword: Environmental Quality, the Courts, and the Congress, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1970).
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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the Act, the House congressional committee with jurisdiction over NEPA
described the law as revolutionary in intent and designed to steer this
Nation on a course of environmental management.3 Early reactions to
the Act suggested that it would become the environmental Magna Carta.4
NEPA has spurred countless lawsuits, put innumerable lawyers and
consultants to work, and, by most accounts, produced a much more
environmentally informed federal bureaucracy.5 Yet it has achieved those
"successes" at the same time that it has become accepted as yet another
"procedural" statute. Courts and commentators alike parrot the common
refrain that NEPA is a procedural statute, it does not demand any
substantive outcome.6 Approximately two and half years after President
Nixon signed NEPA into law, Justice Douglas predicted what he called
the ultimate demise of NEPA.7 But just how Justice Douglas's prediction
became true is not uniformly known. This article, therefore, explores how
NEPA became what it is today, a "procedural" statute.
The need for this exploration is of continuing relevance. At
almost forty, NEPA has endured early attacks, years of scrutiny, task
forces and congressional oversight-all without any substantial change.8
3 COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES, ADMINISTRATION OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT, H.R. REP. 92-316, at 1 (1971).
' Richard A. Liroff, NEPA Litigation in the 1970s: A Deluge or a Dribble?, 21 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 315, 316 (1981).
' The most informative early studies on NEPA's effectiveness are FREDERICK R.
ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY ACT (1973); RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT (1976); RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CHANGE: THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969, 1970-1971 (1972) (Ph.D.
thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill); RICHARD A. LIROFF, A NATIONAL
POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976) [hereinafter "A
NATIONAL POLICY"]; RICHARD A. LIROFF, NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH: A STUDY OF
IMPLEMENTATION, COMPLIANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1976) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Northwestern University) [hereinafter "NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH"]. See generally
RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004).
6 See Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756 (2004) ("NEPA imposes only
procedural requirements . . ").
' Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926, 933 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
8 For insightful commentary about NEPA and its early and later effectiveness, see
LYNTON K CALDWELL, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: AN AGENDA FOR THE
FUTURE (1998); MATTHEW J. LINDSTROM & ZACHARY A. SMITH, THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: JUDICIAL MISCONSTRUCTION, LEGISLATIVE INDIFFERENCE
& EXECUTIVE NEGLECT (2001); William L. Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Promise: The
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It weathered the 1970s energy crisis battered, but far from beaten.'
Today, NEPA can help address what is ostensibly the most significant
environmental problem in our history-climate change.' ° In its newest
application, one fundamental question surfaces: does NEPA have suffi-
cient or additional capacity to ensure that federal activities are governed
by the principle of sustainability? Without the inclusion of sustainability,
NEPA cannot become a useful tool to blunt any further increase in
greenhouse gas emissions generated as a consequence of federal actions.
NEPA may have the power to face the task. Richard N. L. Andrews
aptly observed that "U.S. environmental policy today must recover an
essential missing element: a broadly shared vision of the common envi-
ronmental good."" That shared vision is what Congress intended to
reflect in NEPA, when it sought to establish a
national policy which will encourage productive and en-
joyable harmony between man and his environment; to
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the
health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding
Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L.J.
205 (1989); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333 (2004);
Kenneth M. Murchison, Does NEPA Matter?-An Analysis of the Historical Development
and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L.
REV. 557 (1984); Joseph Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 239
(1973). In 1979, Lynton Caldwell wrote that the Act had been successful in achieving
many of its objectives. Lynton K. Caldwell, Is NEPA Inherently Self-Defeating?, 9 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 50001, 50006-07 (1979).
In 2002, a Bush Administration task force explored the possibility of infusing the
Act with new ideas. See NEPA TASK FORCE, MODERNIZING NEPA IMPLEMENTATION
(2003). No action has yet been taken on the Task Force report, and recent congressional
hearings on NEPA similarly have left the statute intact. See LINDALUTHER, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND
IMPLEMENTATION CRS-34 -35 (2008), available at http://www.enviro-lawyer.com/
NEPASummary.pdf; see also NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION
ADVISORY COMMITrEE, FINAL REPORT: SUMMARY (2005).
9 See, e.g., James J. Hoecker, The NEPA Mandate and Federal Regulation of the Natural
Gas Industry, 13 ENERGY L.J. 265, 267 (1992).
" See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508
(9th Cir. 2007), opinion vacated and superseded on denial of rehearing 538 F.3d 1172 (9th
Cir. 2008)).
11 Richard N. L. Andrews, Learning from History: U.S. Environmental Politics, Policies,
and the Common Good, ENV'T., Nov. 2006, at 28, 42.
2009] 485
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLLY REV.
of the ecological systems and natural resources important
to the Nation... 12
Although sustainable development is not explicitly mentioned in NEPA,
the principle that development must satisfy the needs not only of the
present but also future generations is undoubtedly imbedded in NEPA's
directive. 3 The Supreme Court's crabbed interpretations of the Act as a
procedural statute suggest that the Court did not appreciate or under-
stand the Act itself or what Congress intended. 4 Some observers lament
the Court's treatment of the Act, particularly during the 1970s, 5 and
urge that the Act embrace new approaches. 6 Only soluble precedent
12 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
13 One of NEPA's directives is that
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to use all
practicable means and measures, including financial and technical
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). This language is well within theoretical and
practical policy conceptions of sustainable development. See WORLD COMMISSION ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE, pt. I, % 27-30 (Oxford Univ.
1987); Gro Harlem Brundtland, Afterword: Global Change and Our Common Future, in
CHERYL SIMONS SILVER & RUTH S. SILVER, ONE EARTH, ONE FUTURE: OUR CHANGING
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 147-57 (National Academy Press 1990); John C. Dernbach,
Sustainable Development as a Framework for National Governance, 49 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1, 29-31 (1998); J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law,
21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 181, 185 (2003); Kai N. Lee, Searching for Sustainability in
the New Century, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 913, 913-21 (2001); J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable
Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 31, 31-34 (1999).14 Lynton K Caldwell, NEPA Revisited: A Call for a Constitutional Amendment, ENVrL.
F., Nov. 1989, at 21.
15 See, e.g., David R. Hodas, NEPA, Ecosystem Management and Environmental
Accounting, 14 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'r. 185, 186-87 (2000); Thomas 0. McGarity,
Judicial Enforcement of NEPA-Inspired Promises, 20 ENvTL. L. 569, 571-76 (1990);
Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20 ENVTL. L. 533,539-46 (1990).
"
6 See Dinah Bear, The Promise of NEPA, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAw 179-80 (William
J. Snape III ed., 1995); see also Philip Michael Ferester, Revitalizing the National
Environmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptions from NEPA'S Progeny, 16 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 255-69 (1992); Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures Without Purpose:
The Withering Away of the National Environmental Policy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 245,246-67 (2000); Joel A. Mintz, Taking Congress's Words
Seriously: Towards a Sound Construction of NEPA's Long Overlooked Interpretation
[Vol. 33:483
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prevents a critical reexamination of whether NEPA's directive to use all
practicable means to ensure harmony between nature and present and
future generations is a substantive standard for measuring the appropri-
ateness of agency decisions."
If we conclude that the Act provides sufficient flexibility to accom-
modate the now mainstream acceptance of sustainability as a shared
vision and policy that animates decisions by federal agencies, and that
NEPA balances values with that policy directive in mind, then the Act
could become a more effective mechanism for ensuring that our already
stressed natural systems are not unduly compromised.'" Two reasons
illustrate why the Act might be of particular relevance in the context of
sustainable development. First, focusing on the environmental policy and
Mandate, 38 ENVTL. L. 1031, 1044-51 (2008); Paul S. Weiland, Amending the National
Environmental Policy Act: Federal Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century,
12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 275, 290-93 (1997).
One way that some believe the Act could be strengthened is with more effective
follow-up monitoring of decisions and the use of adaptive management to mitigate
unanticipated or incorrectly assumed impacts. See Hodas, supra note 15, at 188-91;
Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 970-72 (2002);
Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on the
Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 46-54 (1990); Julie Thrower, Comment,
Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View of Ecosystems Mandates
Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871, 884-95 (2006). Bradley Karkkainen suggests
that NEPA requires a shake-up, and he focuses less on the need for any substantive
management and more on a need to recognize that the Act demands too much
clairvoyance and should instead incorporate empirical testing, follow-up monitoring, and
adaptive management. Karkkainen, at 908,948. His suggestions are consistent with the
Council on Environmental Quality's own observations. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT: A STUDY OF ITS EFFECTIVENESS
AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 32-33 (1997).
While I agree with these observations, such an approach requires identifying,
at the outset, some principles generating the need to test, monitor, and adapt. If the Act
is simply an information disclosure statute, focused on a public dialogue revolving around
the impossible task of predicting the future, then why would there be a need to test,
monitor, and adapt?
" One of the principals involved in NEPA's development argued many years after the Act's
passage, that the purposes of the Act had not yet been fully realized, in large measure
because the Act's substantive mandate had been lost. CALDWELL, supra note 8, at 145-72.
8 See James McElfish & Elisa Parker, REDISCOVERING THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYACT: BACKTO THE FUTURE, (Envtl. L. Inst. 1995), available at http://www.elistore
.org/Data/products/d4.00.pdf; James McElfish, Back to the Future, ENVTL. F., Sept.-Oct.
1995, at 14-15 (arguing that NEPA could become more effective as a substantive mandate
for sustainable development).
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goals of NEPA might allow the Act to become malleable enough to ad-
dress an evolving understanding of how agency decisions affect the
environment. 9 Second, acknowledging NEPA's inherent preference for
sustainability should force agencies to assign values to the complex
interaction among environmental, economic and social equities involved
in their decisions.2" The assignment of values allows for a better under-
standing of the relative impact of agency actions.2' In fact, the industry of
ecosystem services has developed to perform precisely such a task.22 Some
federal agencies already incorporate such valuations when following other
legislative mandates, accordingly, agencies lack neither capability nor
expertise to prevent the extension of ecosystem services to NEPA.23
Yet, it all starts with the weak foundational base supporting
NEPA's relegation to a procedural statute. When the Supreme Court first
began to review cases involving an alleged violation of the Act, modern
"9 CALDWELL, supra note 8, at 147. The simple view that proposed federal actions are
measured against their impact to a static existing environmental picture-the
baseline-is somewhat dated. See Amy Siden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth
of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 593 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, The
Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling ofEnvironmental Law,
27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23 (1994); Jonathan Baert Weiner, Beyond the Balance
ofNature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL' F. 1, 1 (1996). Ecological systems are dynamic and
complex, making baseline comparisons rather inept at capturing the true impact of
human intervention. Karin P. Sheldon, Upstream of Peril: The Role of Federal Lands in
Addressing the Extinction Crisis, 24 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 6 (2007) ("We now know that
the equilibrium paradigm is wrong. Ecosystems are dynamic, unpredictable, perhaps
even chaotic."). For a discussion of how the current administration of NEPA generally
follows a framework that assumes a "balance of nature" theory different than our modern
understanding of the non-equilibrium paradigm, see Thrower, supra note 16.
20 Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 909.
21Hodas, supra note 15, at 185 ("By using estimates of ecosystem service values in project
appraisals, the loss of ecosystem services could be weighed against the benefits of a
specific project to estimate the true societal cost of the project.").
22 The concept of ecosystem services is now mainstream and widely recognized as an
invaluable approach for identifying, valuing, and protecting natural capital. J.B. Ruhl
& James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 157, 165 (2007). See generally James Salzman, Creating Markets for
Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870 (2005).
' Robert Fischman suggests that the Environmental Protection Agency, through the use
of its Clean Air Act § 309 authority, could provide guidance for integrating ecosystem
services into NEPA documents. Robert L. Fischman, The EPA's NEPA Duties and
Ecosystem Services, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 497, 508-10 (2001). He appears to recognize,
however, that the courts' stripping of NEPA's substantive mandate is what potentially
makes the application of ecosystem services in the NEPA context somewhat
discretionary. Id. at 506.
488 [Vol. 33:483
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principles of administrative law had yet to crystalize.24 Appreciating this
fact is important for two reasons. First, Congress could not have antici-
pated how the Court would interpret the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA") or NEPA. Congress most likely intended that its newly adopted
national policy for the environment would not create a private cause of
action against individual polluters.2" As such, the final language of NEPA
only provides that "Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a
healthful environment and that each person has a responsibility to
contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment."26
This language originally would have provided "each person has a funda-
mental and inalienable right to a healthful environment."27 This change
by today's standards may appear unexceptional, but in the late 1960s,
Congress had not passed environmental legislation such as the Clean
Water Act, the Clean Air Act or the Endangered Species Act, which
include citizen suit provisions.28 In addition, the developing environmen-
tal bar in the late 1960s anxiously explored all avenues for securing
judicial relief against industrial polluters.29
But, it would be a mistake to confuse Congress's apparent rejection
of polluter targeted citizen suits under NEPA with how federal agency
2 McGarity, supra note 15, at 570.
2' The Act, for instance, would not justify a private citizen suit against an industrial
company for discharges of toxins into a waterway. Pub. Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
26 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (2000 & Supp. V 2005); see also Liroff, supra note 5, at 27
(explaining how the language became modified).
27 Liroff, supra note 5, at 16 (internal citation omitted).
28 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 11(g), 87 Stat. 884, 897
(1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 505, 86 Stat. 816, 888 (1972) (codified at 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (2006)); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 304(a), 84
Stat. 1676, 1706 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
29 In one of the first environmental textbooks, the authors explored a host of new theories
to support a private cause of action, such as the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, the
public trust doctrine, and the Civil Rights Act. VICTOR J. YANNACONE, JR., BERNARD S.
COHEN & STEVEN G. DAVISON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 9-11 (1972). These
authors observed that "[t]he basic element is recognition by our courts that the public has
an absolute right to a salubrious environment ... ." Id. at 9. Their observation occurred
shortly after parties were generally unsuccessful in bringing qui tam (private attorney
general) lawsuits against industrial polluters for alleged violations of the Rivers and
Harbors Act. See Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National Water
Policy and the Evolution of Federal Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 884
n.62 (1993). Their focus on the public trust doctrine, however, coincided with Joseph Sax's
path-breaking law review article on the doctrine. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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decisions would be reviewed by the courts. Many administrative law
concepts that today are second nature had yet to develop, and nothing
suggests a prescient Congress. Could citizens challenge governmental
action? Would a court afford standing to a party claiming that an agency's
decision adversely affected the environment? If courthouses were opened
to citizens, what would be legitimate grounds for a challenge? Would a party
have to claim that an agency acted contrary to some clear statutory pre-
scription and, as such, acted ultra vires? Rather, could a party claim that,
while an agency may have had authority to act, it acted in an unreasonable
manner? Would an agency have to develop an administrative record, and
would it have to issue some document memorializing the reasons for its de-
cision? When would an agency's conduct be challengeable in court? Would
the challenge require a typical trial, with testimony and cross-examination
of agency witnesses? Moreover, how would a court review the merits of a
challenge to an administrative decision? These issues and more were well
beyond the horizon when Congress passed NEPA. It would be unreason-
able, therefore, to expect that Congress appreciated and addressed each of
these questions when it directed a new national environmental policy.
Consequently, the courts had to meld NEPA's application into
APA jurisprudence. For the most part, this meant answering three
separate questions: first, on what basis could a court review and assess
an agency's compliance with NEPA's procedural requirements; second,
how should courts interpret and apply Congress's substantive mandate
that agencies use all practicable means to advance the goals of the Act;
and third, how could parties challenge an agency's underlying implemen-
tation of its statutory program.30
In answering these questions, the 1970's Court would be writing
on a clean slate. In one instance, the Court answered these question
separately. When applying the Endangered Species Act, the Court
concluded that the Endangered Species Act contains a substantive
mandate, a procedural mandate, and that those two issues are independ-
ent of any review of the agency's implementation of its statutory pro-
gram." But this was not the case with NEPA. Instead, the Court gener-
ally conflated all three questions, 2 in an effort to cement its view of the
o For example, an analogous problem arises as to whether private citizens can challenge
an agency decision to build a highway through a park on the grounds that the decision
was arbitrary and capricious. See infra Part V.A.
a' Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172, 180-81 (1978); see also infra note 283.
32 See, e.g., Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (reasoning based on conceptions of
standing derived from administrative law) [hereinafter SCRAP I].
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scope of judicial review under the APA.33 Although never independently
or adequately argued to the Court, the question of NEPA's substantive
mandate became overshadowed by the Court's insistence on focusing
exclusively on the other two questions.34 This emphasis on the scope of
judicial review transformed what could have been a meaningful national
goal for environmental protection into a more subdued-albeit impor-
tant-procedural statute that ensures that decisionmakers recognize the
environmental consequences of their actions and articulate their deci-
sions in light of those consequences.3
5
To illustrate how the Court transformed NEPA, Part I of this
article briefly will review NEPA and its passage in Congress. This sec-
tion does not focus too much on the history, however, because the Court
itself never engaged in any critical examination of Congress's intent. The
article hopes to demonstrate that the Act's broad language provided
courts with the opportunity to explore that intent, but they never mean-
ingfully did so. Part II will illustrate how the language of the Act pro-
vided a range of possibilities for how the law could be administered and
interpreted. Part III will then discuss how the D.C. Circuit, instrumental
in developing administrative law principles, interpreted the Act to
include a substantive component. Part IV will describe the Court's path
to procedure, illustrating how the Court dodged any meaningful inquiry
into NEPA by instead addressing newly emerging principles of standing
and judicial review. In each of the cases, the Court conflated the separate
questions presented by NEPA's application to administrative decision
making. Finally, Part V of the article will discuss how the Court closed
the first decade of the Act with a decision that firmly interred any linger-
ing hope for a substantive mandate under the Act, but it did so with
strikingly little reason to believe that its holding warrants avoiding any
need for a re-examination. The final section summarizes and concludes
that the path for reviving NEPA's potential runs through the agencies
themselves.
33 David C. Shilton, Is the Supreme Court Hostile to NEPA? Some Possible Explanations
for a 12-0 Record, 20 ENVTL. L. 551, 562-64 (1990).
See id. at 566-67; see infra Part IV.E.35 Eva H. Hanks & John L. Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suits
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 230, 253-54
(1970).
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I. THE PINNACLE: CONGRESS PASSES THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
"From all indications 1969 was the magic year for news of the en-
vironmental crisis."36 It was the year that Congress passed NEPA, one of
the most significant environmental acts ever passed according to many. 7
Its transformative nature influenced many states to adopt their own state
version of the Act, and several other countries followed suit as well.38 With
its passage, the environmental movement gathered momentum. 9
Considerable history presaged the passage of NEPA.40 Through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, our society, including Congress, became
acutely aware of the growing environmental crisis.4' By 1966, the need
for Congress to act prompted Lynton Caldwell, a prominent professor of
Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, to write the
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and urge the passage
of a then pending bill that would have facilitated "better organization
36 DAVID M. RUBIN & DAVID P. SACHS, MASS MEDIA AND THE ENVIRONMENT: WATER
RESOURCES, LAND USE AND ATOMIC ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA 54 (1973). In 1969 a group of
lawyers, professors and conservation leaders gathered in Warrenton, Virginia (the Arlie
Conference) to talk for two days about potential and evolving legal tools for protecting
and enhancing our environment. See MALCOLM BALDWIN & JAMES K PAGE, JR., LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1970) (transcription of conference discussion and papers). A
prominent participant at the Arlie Conference proclaimed that NEPA would "broaden
significantly the scope ofjudicial review in environmental cases ... . "David Sive, Some
Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 649 (1970).
37 Karkkainen, supra note 16, at 904 n.1.
38 See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 12:1-12:2 (2d ed. 2001);
Nicholas A. Robinson, International Trends in Environmental ImpactAssessment, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 591,597 (1992). See generally J.R. MCNEILL, SOMETHING NEWUNDER
THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY WORLD (2000).
" For example, in 1970 both Mother Earth News, the magazine, and the celebration of
Earth Day entered American society. NationMaster, The Mother Earth News,
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/the-mother-earth-news (last visited Feb. 2,
2009); Gaylord Nelson, Environmental Protection Agency, Earth Day'70: What it Meant,
http'//www.epa.gov/history/topics/earthday/02.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).
4 Ronald Lee Shelton, The Environmental Era: A Chronological Guide to Policy and
Concepts, 1962-1972 (May 1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on
file with author).
41 See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1999) (discussing Congress's
environmental actions beginning in the 1940's); see, e.g., STUART L. UDALL, THE QUIET
CRISIS (1963) (championing stewardship and the need to address anthropogenic impacts
on the environment and our landscape).
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and reinforcement of research on conditions of our natural environ-
ment."42
But during these formative years, the critical issue became which
committee-or more precisely, which Senator-would carry the cudgel.
Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson's close advisor, William J. Van Ness, devel-
oped a legislative game plan that would vest authority with Senator Jack-
son, as Chair of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs."
Senator Muskie, by contrast, had been the principal architect of many of
the media specific environmental programs, such as for clean air and
water." Further, both of these Senators would soon be in a race for the
Democratic Presidential nomination.' Van Ness wrote a memorandum out-
lining the need for environmental legislation." In this memorandum, Van
Ness explained that "environment" was at least a useful, if not necessary fo-
cus of public policy and that the time appeared ripe for a legislative proposal:
The fact that there has not been a comprehensive national
environmental policy, and that our past institutional
arrangements have been better adapted to exploitation of
the environment than to its rational planned use, protec-
tive custody and self-renewing development does not mean
that there should not or will not in the future be an envi-
ronmental policy.
47
42Shelton, supra note 40, at 77. Caldwell's letter drew from his seminal article on the role
of environmental issues in public policy written three years earlier. Id.; see also Lynton
Caldwell, Environment:A New Focus for Public Policy, 23 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 132 (1963).
43 See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORYOFTHE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774- 2005, H.R. Doc.
No. 108-222, at 1319 (2005) (noting Senator Jackson's chairmanship of the committee).
44 For example, during the 1963 session of the 88th Congress, Senator Muskie sponsored
or co-sponsored bills to establish both water and air pollution control programs. See 109
CONG. REC. 1430 (1963) (statement of Sen. Muskie); 109 CONG. REC. 20,532 (1963)
(statement of Sen. Ribicoff). Later in December 1966, Senator Muskie urged the creation
of a Select Committee on Technology and the Human Environment, to serve as a
temporary forum for assessing the nexus between scientific and technological innovation,
their impact on the human environment, and the potential role of the federal government
in these areas in the future. S. RES. 298, 89th Cong. (2d Sess. 1966); 112 CONG. REC.
20,542, 20,542-44 (1966). See generally Bates College Edmund S. Muskie Archives &
Special Collection, Online Legislative Record of Senator Edmund S. Muskie:
Congressional Record Indexes, http://abacus.bates.edu/muskie-archives/ajcr/CR%20
Indexes.shtml (last visited Mar. 3,2009) (listing all Sen. Muskie's Congressional actions).
" Our Campaigns, US President - D Convention 1972, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/
RaceDetail.html?RaceID=58482 (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
46 113 CONG. REC. 36,856 (1967); see also 115 Cong. Rec.3699 (1969) (statement of Sen.
Jackson) (discussing influence of Professor Caldwell's scholarship).
47 113 CONG. REC. 36857 (1967).
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He then attached to the memorandum a draft of proposed legisla-
tive language, which he hoped would "bring into focus the overall nature
of the environmental quality problems faced by the Nation and provide
the research and leadership necessary for their resolution."' This memo-
randum later accompanied Senator Jackson's introduction of proposed
legislation in December, 1967.' 9
Although numerous bills were introduced in both the House and
Senate during 1968 and 1969, the two principal bills that emerged were
S. 1075, introduced by Senator Jackson on February 18, 1969, and H.R.
12549, sponsored by Congressman John Dingell and others on July 1,
1969.50 During a hearing on S. 1075 in April 1969, Professor Caldwell
first introduced the idea of adding a new element into the existing
legislative proposals.51 Professor Caldwell suggested the legislation
include some action forcing mechanism, which ultimately became § 102
of the Act.52
The Senate passed S. 1075 on July 10, 1969 and referred the bill
to the House of Representatives, which had already conducted hearings
on Congressmen Dingell's bill.53 The House passed H.R. 12549 on Sep-
tember 23, 1969, after which the two houses convened a conference
" Id.
49 113 CONG. REC. 36849-57 (1967). The following year, in 1968, Senator Jackson and
others convened a colloquium on the need for developing a uniform approach to national
environmental policy, which led to a report drafted by Professor Caldwell, with the
assistance of Van Ness and the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INTERIORAND INsULAR AFFAIRS, 90TH CONG., NATIONAL POLICY FOR
THE ENVIRONMENT. A REPORT ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPLANATION OF ITS PURPOSE AND CONTENT; AND EXPLORATION OF
MEANS TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE; AND A LISTING OF QUESTIONS IMPLICIT IN ITS
ESTABLISHMENT, TOGETHER WITH A STATEMENT BY SEN. HENRY M. JACKSON iv (Comm.
Print 1968). Bill Van Ness had hired Professor Caldwell, through the services of the
Conservation Foundation, to assist the Committee and hopefully provide academic clout
to the Senator's proposal. Personal Communications with William J. Van Ness, Advisor
to Sen. Jackson (on file with author). Russell Train, the then President of the
Conservation Fund, recalls that Mr. Caldwell was part of a small Foundation advisory
board. Environmental Protection Agency, Russell E. Train: Oral History Interview,
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/print/train.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2009).
10 115 CONG. REC. 3698 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 17983 (1969).
51 See 115 CONG. REC. 9197-200 (1969) (reproducing Professor Caldwell's statement).
52Id. at 9199. Liroffnotes that the committee staff already had been considering the idea
of some action forcing mechanism, and that Professor Caldwell"lent new impetus to their
considerations." LIROFF, supra note 5, at 16.
' LUTHER, supra note 8, at 3.
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committee to reconcile the competing House and Senate proposals.'
Other Senators, not on the conference committee, raised concerns about
the role of agencies policing themselves on environmental matters. 55 The
conference recommended solicitation of comments on proposed actions by
other air and water pollution control agencies.56 Ultimately, the confer-
ence committee reported its recommendation, and in December, both hou-
ses passed the legislation, which President Nixon signed on January 1, 1970.
As passed, NEPA contains three principal parts. First, Title I of
the Act declares a national environmental policy and establishes goals.
Congress declared, in part:
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in
cooperation with State and local governments, and other
concerned public and private organizations, to use all
practicable means and measures... to create and main-
tain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
other requirements of present and future generations of
Americans.5"
Congress also "authorize [d] and direct [ed], to the fullest extent possible,"
that all policies, regulations and laws of the United States be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies of the Act.59 Congress
separately required agencies to "identify and develop methods and proce-
dures" for ensuring that "presently unquantified environmental ameni-
ties and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision
making along with economic and technical considerations." ° In § 103 of
5Id. at 5-6.
" See 115 Cong. Rec. 29053 (1969).
56 Id. at 29054-56.
57 115 CONG. REc. 39701 (1969); 115 CONG. REC. 40415 (1969); see Daniel A. Dreyfus &
Helen M. Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act: A View of Intent and Practice,
16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 243 (1976). One of NEPA's draftsman on Senator Jackson's
committee later recounted that "[tihere are few clues in the legislative history concerning
what NEPA's Congressional authors expected impact statements to look like."Id. at 256.
8 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
59 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
60 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Agencies also are instructed to "utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural
and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decision-
making which may have an impact on man's environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2000 &
2009] 495
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV.
the Act, Congress directed agencies to review their statutory authorities
and policies to determine if any "deficiencies or inconsistencies" existed
with NEPA.6" Agencies had to report any authorities or policies which
might "prohibit full compliance with the purposes and provisions" to the
President by July 1, 1971, along with "measures... necessary to bring
their authority and policies into conformity with the intent, purposes,
and procedures" of the Act."
Second, Title I contains an action-forcing mechanism, requiring
the preparation of a "detailed statement," now referred to as an Environ-
mental Impact Statement ("EIS"), for any "proposals for legislation [or]
other major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment ...... As part of any EIS, an agency must address:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between the local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented."
Third, Title II of the Act authorized the establishment, in the
Executive Office, of a Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ").65 The
establishment of the CEQ illustrates the unique political circumstances
Supp. V 2005). For resource-oriented projects, Congress added that agencies "initiate and
utilize ecological information in the planning and development" stages. 42 U.S.C. §
4332(H) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
61 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
62 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
' Id. Congress directed that, prior to any EIS, agencies consult with and solicit the views
of Federal, State and local environmental agencies, and provide any such comments to
the public and to the Council on Environmental Quality. Id. Independent of any EIS,
agencies also must "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to
recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts
concerning alternative uses of available resources." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(E) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005).
42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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surrounding the passage of NEPA. To begin with, President Nixon
established an interagency Environmental Quality Council and a Citi-
zens Advisory Committee on Environmental Quality, in an Executive
Order issued on May 29, 1969.6 The House appropriators, however,
refused to fund the council or the committee, noting that such a patch-
work effort by the President to address environmental issues would not
be productive and it would be better to wait for Congress.67 Congressman
Dingell steadfastly believed that the CEQ needed a statutory mandate."
The concept of a CEQ was reportedly modeled after the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors, established by the 1946 Employment Act.69 The existing
Citizens Advisory Committee, however, was concerned about its fate; as
such, it requested that Senator Jackson include language in NEPA
supporting the Advisory Committee, in addition to the CEQ.7° Senator
Jackson agreed, and this became § 205(1) of the Act.7
The CEQ gathered strength through other legislation.72 This
additional legislation made 1970 appear to be the year of the environ-
ment.7 ' Although Congressman Richard L. Ottinger criticized these
efforts as nothing more than "rhetoric without commitment" lacking any
real detail or substance,74 President Nixon's 1970 State of the Union
66 Exec. Order No. 11,472, 34 Fed. Reg. 8693 (May 29, 1969). The Advisory Committee
was chaired by Laurance Rockefeller and it superseded the earlier President's Council
on Recreation and Natural Beauty. Shelton, supra note 40, at 220. Senator Jackson
allegedly opposed this effort by the President, and at least delayed the President's
issuance of the order for several months. LIROFF, supra note 5, at 21.6 7 DEPT OF THE INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970, H.R. Rep.
91-361, at 12 (1969).
6 LIROFF, supra note 5, at 22-23. Liroff notes earlier bills creating a CEQ had been
introduced in the 91st Congress. Id. at 24.
69 Lynton K Caldwell, Implementing NEPA: A Non-Technical Political Task, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND NEPA: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 25, 38 (Ray Clark &
Larry Canter eds., 1997).
" Letter from Henry L. Diamond to Mr. William Van Ness (Oct. 23, 1969) (on file with
author).
71 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 205(1), 83 Stat. 852,
855 (1970) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 4345 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
2 E.g., Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 203(a), 84
Stat. 114, 114 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)); see Robert F.
Bloomquist, Senator Edmund S. Muskie and the Dawn ofModern American Environmental
Law: First Term, 1959-1964,26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 509 (2002) (describing
the numerous legislative successes of Senator Muskie that reinforced NEPA).
73COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 5 (1970).7 4Press Release, Congressman Richard L. Ottinger (Jan. 22, 1970) (on file with author).
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Address praised these enactments and discussed the need for further
efforts to protect our environment." On March 5, 1970, the President
issued Executive Order No. 11514, entitled "Protection and Enhance-
ment of Environmental Quality," conferring upon the CEQ the authority
to; coordinate NEPA and develop guidelines for the appropriate
agencies.76 In a Saturday Review article in 1970, Barry Commoner wrote
that "[tihe sudden public concern with the environment has taken many
people by surprise," adding further that "it is not so clear how the move-
ment came about and where it is going."77 But how courts would respond
to this mushrooming concern for environmental protection when pre-
sented with a case involving NEPA was an open question.
II. NEPA: A STATUTE WHOSE MEANING HAD TO BE WRITTEN
As the government began implementing NEPA, nothing dictated
how the Act would be applied or interpreted.7" The CEQ's early guidance
lacked executive mandate.79 Judge Friendly aptly observed that it is "so
broad, yet opaque, that it will take even longer than usual fully to compre-
hend its impact."' ° Not surprisingly, different views of what the statute
" State of the Union Message-The Address of the President of the United States of
America, H.R. Doc. No. 91-226 (1970).
76 Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 902, 903-04 (1966-1970).
"7Barry Commoner, Beyond the Teach-In, SATURDAY REV., Apr. 4, 1970, at 50-52, 62-64,
reprinted in AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: READINGS IN CONSERVATION HISTORY 206
(Roderick Frazier Nash ed., 3rd ed. 1990).
78 Early guidance from the CEQ was not particularly helpful. The CEQ's first interim
guidelines, issued in April 1970 primarily reaffirmed NEPA and focused on the
production of "detailed statements," they also required strict and immediate compliance
with the Act and added the concept of a draft environmental statement. ANDREWS, supra
note 5, at 29-30. Other guidelines followed in 1971 and 1973. Id. at 34-38.
" President Carter's Executive Order 11,991 required agencies to comply with CEQ
guidelines. Exec. Order 11,991, 3 C.F.R. 123 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005). The CEQ then responded with regulations in 1978. See Council on
Environmental Quality, Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. pt. 1500-1508 (1981); see also Council on
Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act: Administrative Interpretation,
42 Fed. Reg. 61,066 (Dec. 1, 1977). In 1979, the Supreme Court afforded CEQ's regulations
prominence. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 347-49, 358-59, 362 (1979). It was not
until 1981 however, that CEQ issued its famous "Forty Questions," amplifying the meaning
of those regulations. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National
Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 (Mar. 23, 1981).
o City of New Yorkv. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See generally
Frank B. Friedman, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969-The Brave New
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meant quickly surfaced. In May of 1970, Senator Jackson published a short
article proclaiming that the "[tihe Act makes a concern for environmental
values and amenities a part of the charter of every agency of the federal
government."8 ' Some observers believed that this meant that NEPA would
become an environmental bill of rights, or at the very least expand agencies'
statutory mandates and perhaps force substantive outcomes. 2 This ap-
proach arguably would have been consistent with Congress's directive in
1972 to explore the possibility of an environmental court.83
Others believed that NEPA might simply foster more environmen-
tally informed decision-making than in the past, but not much else.' In
1972, Chief Justice Burger presaged this approach, when he reviewed
and reluctantly denied an application to stay a preliminary injunction in
one of the earliest NEPA cases, observing:
Our society and its governmental instrumentalities, hav-
ing been less than alert to the needs of our environment
for generations, have now taken protective steps. These
World of Environmental Legislation, 6 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 44 (1973) (discussing
several important court decisions which give insight to some of NEPA's unclear
provisions and analyzing the administrative processes NEPA provides for).
81 Jackson, supra note 1, at 1079.
82 See Ronald B. Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NAT.
RESOURCES LAw. 387, 387 (1974); see also Richard S. Arnold, The Substantive Right to
Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 ENVTL. L. REP.
50028, 50031-32 (1973) (noting that the first cases construing NEPA concluded that the
Act provided a clear mandate for environmental protection reviewable in courts); Virginia
F. Coleman, Possible Repercussions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 on
the Private Law Governing Pollution Abatement Suits, 3 NAT. RESOURCES LAw. 647
(1970) (arguing that NEPA might provide grounds for federal claims against polluters
because it formally recognizes an interest in a healthy environment); Hanks & Hanks,
supra note 35; Victor J. Yannacone, Jr., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1
ENVTL. L. 8, 14 (1970) (asserting that NEPA's most important aspect was the
requirement that agencies' policies, regulations and statutes be interpreted, "to the
fullest extent possible," in accordance with NEPA's policies).
' Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 9, 86 Stat. 816, 899 (1972). The
Nixon Administration however, ultimately rejected this idea. See U.S. ATT'Y GEN.,
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE FEASIBILITY
OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM (1973). An environmental court
with "expertise" on environmental matters would presumably be capable of substantively
reviewing the decisions of federal agencies and determining whether those decisions
appropriately balanced environmental and non-environmental values. Scott C. Whitney,
The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV.
473, 478-79 (1973).
' See Friedman, supra note 80, at 44 n.2.
20091 499
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLLY REV.
developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead
courts to exercise equitable powers loosely or casually
whenever a claim of 'environmental damage' is asserted.
The world must go on and new environmental legislation
must be carefully meshed with more traditional patterns
of federal regulation. The decisional process for judges is
one of balancing and it is often a most difficult task.85
By 1974, an Environmental Law Institute author blandly stated that
"NEPA does not guarantee that the course which is shown by the impact
statement to be the least environmentally damaging will be followed." 6
He noted that the lack of any standard, other than the APA's general
standards for review, is what "leads to NEPA being termed a 'procedural'
rather than a 'substantive' statute."7
When Congress passed NEPA, general principles about the
development of an agency administrative record and assurance of rea-
soned agency decision-making had yet to evolve. It is unlikely that those
involved in the development of NEPA could foresee the future and
predict the path that the Supreme Court would take in articulating such
doctrines as the scope of review and standing. Aspects of then existing
administrative law were discussed when NEPA was passed, but since
" Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Reg. Agency Proc. (SCRAP), 409
U.S. 1207, 1217-18 (1972).
86 Robert K. Huffman, The Opportunities for Environmentalists in the Settlement of
NEPA Suits, 4 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 50001, 50002 (1974) (emphasis omitted).87 Id. Huffman nevertheless observed that courts disagreed over the scope of review, with
some courts allowing judicial review under the APA and others not allowing any review.
See id. at 50002 n.5 (comparing cases which denied review such as Natl Helium Corp.
v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) and Conservation Council of N.C. v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) with those that allowed review like Scenic Hudson Pres.
Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926
(1972), Envtl. Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1072 (1973); and Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). The availability of judicial review was an outstanding
question during the 1970s. The Supreme Court had only recently decided Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), and whether compliance with
NEPA was "committed to agency discretion" remained debatable. Indeed, during the
second annual conference on NEPA sponsored by the Environmental Law Institute,
political scientist Helen Ingram (Ms. Ingram worked with one of the Senate staffers who
assisted Bill Van Ness in drafting NEPA, Daniel Dreyfus) suggested that perhaps there
should be no judicial review of whether processes of NEPA are followed. Nan Stockholm,
Verdict on EIS, 4 EPAJ. 24, 25 (1978). Gus Speth, then at CEQ, rejected the idea. Id.
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then what occurred was "a very intensive development" of those princi-
ples.88 Some, such as a co-chairman of the Sierra Club Legal Committee,
although favoring a broad application of NEPA, nevertheless urged
caution.89 Concerned that courts might react negatively if pressed too
quickly, the co-chairman explained:
NEPA is what the courts and the environmental lawyers,
governmental and private, will make of it. There is tre-
mendous potential there. I hope-probably vainly-that
the cases reaching the federal courts in the next two years
will not immediately strain the outermost possibilities of
the act. Judges feel a little more comfortable doing some-
thing that is only a little more than what the last Judge
has done. If the courts are asked to make the leap all at
once, I doubt they will do so. I am hopeful, however, that
gradual common-law case-by-case type of development can
make NEPA into something like an environmental Magna
Charta.90
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT & CALVERT CLIFFS
The development of NEPA did follow a common-law case-by-case
approach, but only as a side show to the D.C. Circuit's and the Supreme
Court's ultimate articulation of the role of the courts in reviewing agency
actions under the APA. Prior to the 1970s, the D.C. Circuit had exercised
jurisdiction over cases that are now tried in the District of Columbia
court system (the equivalent state court system), and it was mostly
known for its criminal law decisions.9 Congress finally removed its
jurisdiction over local matters in 1970 and, as a court uniquely experi-
enced to address challenges to federal agency decisions,92 it became
poised to influence the course of administrative law.
' William F. Kennedy, Remarks, 7 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 361, 362 (1974).
'9 R. Frederic Fisher, Environmental Lawyer in the Lion's Mouth: Litigation Before and
Against Administrative Agencies, reprinted in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, TRANSCRIPTS OF THE SPEECHES: NOVEMBER 1970 63, 102 (1971).
90 Id.
91See John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92
VA. L. REV. 375 (2006).
92Id. at 388-89; see also Matthew Warren, Note,Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and
the Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002).
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Its rising prominence in the field of administrative law coincided
with the emergence of federal agencies' greater reliance on new forms of
administrative decision-making, such as rulemaking in lieu of adju-
dicatory hearings.93 The APA directed reviewing courts to explore
whether, when rendering any final agency action, the agency acted
arbitrarily or capriciously, abused its discretion, or otherwise acted
contrary to law.s4 The D.C. Circuit engaged in a campaign during the
1970s to afford meaning to this language 5 and developed the "hard look"
doctrine to provide courts with the justification for ensuring that an
agency examined the relevant factors and articulated a satisfactory
explanation for its decision.9
Two opposing trends virtually assured that NEPA would play a
prominent role in the court's effort to strengthen the APA. On the one
hand, NEPA became an instant tool for plaintiffs intent on preventing
environmentally harmful projects. By 1972, the Justice Department
reported that NEPA cases "increasingly dominated the kinds of litigation
handled by the General Litigation Section."9 7 NEPA produced more cases
than any other environmental program in the 1970's.ss
Also, that a need would arise to interpret the breadth of NEPA
became acutely necessary as a backlash against the statute surfaced in
some of the Federal agencies.9 9 In a June 1971 speech, the Interior De-
partment's Commissioner for the Bureau of Reclamation warned that
93 See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 426 (1976).
94 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
" See Warren, supra note 92; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Special Contributions
of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 779 (2002); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717 (1997).
' See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal
Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974); Stephen F. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking"
Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L.
REV. 401 (1975).
9 1972 Anr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 111.9 8 See LETrIE M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT 10, 82 (1982) (noting
that at least 855 cases cited NEPA in their arguments).
9 See James S. Bowman, The Environmental Movement: An Assessment of Ecological
Politics, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 649, 653 (1976) (describing a lack of financial and administrative
backing from the executive branch for environmental programs which did not also have
a strong economic benefit); Hanna J. Cortner, A Case Analysis of Policy Implementation:
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 323, 323-325




NEPA was "being utilized.., to build up a curtain of blind and unthink-
ing opposition which could swamp the agencies ... ,lO0 The Nixon ad-
ministration arguably became hostile to the Act, nearly suggesting
Congress amend NEPA.1' Gus Speth, then with the Natural Resources
Defense Council, reported that "environmentalists have been greatly
disturbed for the last six months about the decline of CEQ[;] [i]t is no
longer truly representing environmental interests." °2
This reluctance to embrace the law fully arguably intensified
during the early 1970's energy crisis.'0 a The energy crisis either offered
"cover" or a justification for the Nixon and Ford Administrations to focus
on energy independence in lieu of promoting even further environmental
programs."' The Justice Department presciently observed that "[tihe
energy crisis will ultimately have some impact upon the future of envi-
ronmental litigation."'
Commenting in 1974 on environmental litigation, the Associate
Editor of the Environmental Law Reporter observed that "[iut is impor-
tant to underline that a number of the developments that we see as being
environmental developments really are developments in administrative
law generally."0 6 The D.C. Circuit, in large measure, precipitated these
developments. 1 7 Its influence became apparent in Calvert Cliffs' v. AEC,
where the court provided the opening salvo for how courts should re-
spond to allegations that an agency violated NEPA.'0
"o Claude E. Barfield & Richard Corrigan, White House Seeks to Restrict Scope of
Environmental Law, 4 NAT'L J. 336, 341 (1972).
'"Id. at 336.
102 Id. at 345.
"' See Cortner, supra note 502, at 328-29; LIROFF, supra note 5, at 58.
104 See Bowman, supra note 99, at 654-55 n.31; see also Daniel A. Dreyfus & Richard D.
Grundy, Influence of the Energy Crisis Upon the Future of Environmental Policy, 3
ENVTL. AFF. 252, 267-68 (1974).
105 1974 ATr'Y GEN. ANN REP. 124. The Department observed that:
The development of the energy crisis during the last fiscal year has
added a new dimension to the problem of protecting the environment.
Since the measures which may be taken to increase production of
energy, including the development of new resources, frequently are not
consistent with the protection of the environment, a balancing of
priorities became essential.
Id. at 124-25.
106 Grant P. Thompson, Remarks, 7 NAT. RESOURCEs LAw. 367, 368 (1974).
07 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see infra Part IV.
10 8 Id. at 1111-12.
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Not surprising, the Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") emerged
as a defendant in one the first seminal cases under NEPA. Historically,
the AEC had conceived of its mission in the licensing of nuclear facilities
as limited to ensuring against the special hazard of radiological safety,
and that it exercised exclusive jurisdiction over such matters and lacked
authority to consider any other issues.109 Prior to NEPA, the First Circuit
had held, despite considerable reservations, that the AEC lacked the
authority to consider a nuclear power plant's potential impact on the
environment caused by thermal pollution." ° The AEC, therefore, ex-
pressed concern about the legislation when it was being drafted and
aggressively attempted to blunt its impact."' Approximately a year after
NEPA became law, the AEC developed its first interim and then final
procedures for complying with the newly enacted statute." 2 CEQ sent
mixed messages on these rules, indicating some disagreement while
simultaneously praising AEC's efforts."'
A coalition of national environmental organizations led the fight
to challenge the AEC's implementation of NEPA in court."' They focused
on the AEC's licensing of Baltimore Gas & Electric's Calvert Cliffs
nuclear facility on the shores of the Chesapeake Bay, only sixty miles
" See New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
"' Id. Justice Douglas dissented from the denial of certiorari. New Hampshire v. AEC,
395 U.S. 962, 962 (1969). Though no opinion was published, Justice Douglas most likely
dissented believing that his opinion for the Court in Udall v. Fed. Power Comm'n
suggested a contrary result. There, the Court held that the Federal Power Commission
had to consider environmental values when licensing a hydroelectric facility. 387 U.S.
428, 450 (1967).
"' Letter from Joseph F. Hennessey, General Counsel, Atomic Energy Comm'n, to Jerry
Verkler, Chief of Staff for the S. Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., Sept. 4, 1969 (on file
with author); Letter from Joseph F. Hennessey, General Counsel, Atomic Energy
Comm'n, to Jerry Verkler, Chief of Staff for the S. Interior and Insular Affairs Comm.,
Nov. 12, 1969 (on file with author); Letter from Joseph F. Hennessy, General Counsel,
Atomic Energy Comm'n, to William J. Van Ness, Jr., Advisor to Sen. Jackson, Dec. 15,
1969 (on file with author).
112 Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 35 Fed. Reg. 5463-64 (Apr. 2, 1970)
(to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pts. 2, 50); Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,
35 Fed. Reg. 8594-97 (June 3, 1970) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50); Licensing of
Production and Utilization Facilities, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,469-74 (Dec. 4, 1970) (to be codified
at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50 Appendix D).
113 See LIROFF, supra note 5, at 65-66.
"4 Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs: A Court Construes the National
Environmental Policy Act to Create a Powerful Cause of Action, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
STORIES 77, 101 (Richard J. Lazarus & Oliver A. Houck eds., 2005).
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from Washington."5 The petitioners challenged four principal aspects of
AEC's rules, which together they claimed effectively limited "full consid-
eration and individualized balancing of environmental values in the
Commission's decision making process."" 6 They objected to the prohibi-
tion in the rules that the hearing board could not conduct "an independ-
ent evaluation and balancing of certain environmental factors if other
responsible agencies already have certified that their own environmental
standards are satisfied by the proposed federal action.""7 One of the
principal environmental concerns centered around the plant's with-
drawal of approximately 2.4 million gallons of water per minute from the
Chesapeake Bay and its subsequent discharge back into the Bay at a
higher temperature." 8 Indeed, while Congress actively debated NEPA, the
Act's supporters explained that one of its principal purposes would be to
"help avoid governmental kinks that hamper antipollution efforts," such
as "the Atomic Energy Commission's refusal to take thermal pollution into
consideration in licensing nuclear power plants--on grounds that it has no
legislative mandate to do so."" 9 The AEC's new rules allowed a certifica-
tion of compliance from an appropriate federal or state agency to be
dispositive of environmental impacts, such as water quality effects. 2 '
Next, they objected to the AEC's decision that environmental
factors did not have to be considered by the hearing board conducting a
review of staff recommendations on the licensing, unless the staff or
another party affirmatively raised the need to consider environmental
factors."'2 This, of course, meant that the ultimate decision making body
115 The court consolidated two cases, one involving a general challenge to AEC's rules,
and one challenging the rules as applied to the Calvert Cliffs licensing. Calvert Cliffs
Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116 n.14
(D.C. Cir. 1971). The court opted to address the efficacy of the rules generally rather than
review any particular challenge. Id. The facility was located in Calvert Cliffs, Maryland.
Tarlock, supra note 114, at 89.
116 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1116.
117 Id. at 1117.
11 See Daniel A. Bronstein, The AEC Decision-Making Process and the Environment: A
Case Study of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 689, 694 (1971);
see also Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-224, § 21, 84 Stat. 91, 107
(1970) (attempting to ensure compliance with state water quality standards); S. Rep. No.
91-351, at 3 (1969) (describing the problem of the AEC not addressing thermal pollution
concerns).
119 A Fight Over Who Cleans Up, BUS. W., July 12, 1969, at 46 (discussing Senator
Jackson's comments).
120 S. Rep. No. 91-351, at 3 (1969).
121 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1117.
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would consider environmental issues and perhaps balance environmental
factors only if the staff or a third party affirmatively required that the
board do so. This rule became even more problematic for projects that
had been noticed in the Federal Register prior to March 4, 1971, because
for such projects, the rules prohibited the board from considering
nonradiological environmental issues even if raised by a third party.122
Lastly, petitioners challenged aspects of the rules that allowed the
AEC to defer consideration of environmental issues until the consider-
ation of an operating license, at least for projects that had received a
construction permit prior to the passage of NEPA.121 One of the AEC's
own later characterized the agency's review of environmental issues as
"minimal," and
applicants [generally] supplied the background environ-
mental material in the form of a report, and we used this
material with little or no independent evaluation. The envi-
ronmental Statements prepared by the Commission at that
time were based solely on the material submitted by the
applicants but placed in the format desired by the AEC." u
The court began its opinion by articulating the requirements of
the new law. 25 It emphasized that Congress intended to mandate that
agencies follow the procedures of § 102, with little inherent flexibility to
deviate from those requirements. 26 Judge Wright, however, also opined
that NEPA contains a separate and "explicit" substantive duty under §
10 1(b), for agencies to use all practicable means to protect environmental
values, although in doing so the Act "leaves room for a responsible
exercise of discretion and may not require particular substantive results
in particular problematic instances." 27 This duty effectively undermines
122 Id. at 1117.
" Id.; see also Thomas B. Stoel, Jr., Energy, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 928, 968
(Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974) (describing the two step facility
approval process).
"u Daniel R. Muller, Assistant Director for Environmental Projects, Directorate of
Licensing, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, The Atomic Energy Commission
Environmental Statements for Nuclear Power Reactors, Undated (on file with author);
see also LIROFF, supra note 5, at 66-67, 239 n.106 (noting Muller's 1972 speech).
125 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1112-13.
126 id.
Id. at 1112. Consistent with the court's separation of these two duties, the court rejected
the AEC's attempt to conflate the two duties and suggest that the discretion inherent in the
substantive duty applies to the procedural obligations as well. See id. at 1114 n.10.
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an agency's otherwise crabbed view of its authority, such as that ad-
vanced by the AEC, making "environmental protection a part of the
mandate of every federal agency and department."" Judge Wright added
that the AEC's "hands are no longer tied" and it not only may but must
"take environmental values into account." 129 This obligation becomes
manifest in how an agency complies with its obligation, under § 102, to
engage in a "rather finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing" of environ-
mental values and other "economic and technical benefits."13 Prepara-
tion of a detailed environmental statement, now referred to as the EIS,
accomplishes such a balancing.13' Responding to the AEC's references to
§§ 103, 104 and 105 of the Act, Judge Wright rebuffed any suggestion
that adherence to § 102 was somehow conditioned upon an agency's
decision regarding practicability.'
3 2
Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful
and informed decisionmaking process and creates judi-
cially enforceable duties. The reviewing courts probably
cannot reverse a substantive decision on its merits, under
Section 101, unless it can be shown that the actual bal-
ance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values.'33
When reviewing the AEC's specific regulations, the court observed
the AEC's apparent lack of enthusiasm for complying with NEPA.'" Judge
Wright's framing of the question regarding the AEC's regulations left no
doubt about the outcome of the case: "whether the Commission is correct
in thinking that its NEPA responsibilities may 'be carried out in toto
outside the hearing process'-whether it is enough that environmental
data and evaluations merely 'accompany' an application through the
128 Id. at 1112.
129 Id.
" Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1113 (citing a floor statement from Senator Jackson on the
"requirement of a balancing judgment.") Later in the opinion, Judge Wright would
suggest that the agency must engage in a "rigorous balancing" and "rigorous
consideration of environmental factors." Id. at 1128; see also id. at 1129 ("All we demand
is that the environmental review be as full and fruitful as possible.").
131 Id. at 1114.
132 Id. at 1114-1115. See supra note 59 (discussing § 103).
'3 Id. at 1115.
" Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1116. At another point, Judge Wright commented that the
AEC should implement NEPA "at a pace faster than a funeral procession." Id. at 1122.
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review process, but receive no consideration whatever from the hearing
board." 135 He forcefully answered the question in the next sentence, indi-
cating that the AEC's "crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes a mockery
of the Act."' 36 Environmental factors had to be considered throughout the
agency's review process, at all important stages, to ensure that an "overall
balancing of environmental and non-environmental factors" could "mini-
mize environmental costs." 3 v The court added that such consideration and
balancing by the Commission must occur even if not raised by any party.
38
The court found other aspects of AEC's rules equally troubling. To
begin with, AEC's cut-off for not applying NEPA to any projects noticed
before March 4,1971 inappropriately delayed by more than two years the
Act's effective date. 3 s Next, Judge Wright dispatched AEC's argument
that § 21 of the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 applied and, per
NEPA § 104, obviated the need for the AEC to address water quality
issues by reasoning that § 21 established a minimum floor for agency
compliance but did not constrain the agency from imposing even greater
controls. 40 An agency, such as the AEC, had an independent duty to
consider and balance environmental and nonenvironmental factors, and
it could not abdicate that responsibility by merely looking to another
agency's certification regarding water quality impacts.1
4
'
135 Id. at 1117.
136 id.
137 Id. at 1118.
138 Id.
139 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1119.
14 Id. at 1125; see Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 21, 84
Stat. 91, 107-10 (1970).
141 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1125. Although Judge Wright dismissed AEC's reliance on
§ 104, § 511(c)(2) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
overruled part of Judge Wright's analysis. Frederick R. Anderson, Jr., The National
Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW. 238, 290 (Erica L. Dolgin
& Thomas G.P. Guilbert, eds., 1974). Reportedly, AEC had not pushed this amendment,
although it had indicated that NEPA threatened to halt the nuclear power plant licensing
process. Barfield & Corrigan, supra note 100, at 342. At the insistence of Senator Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.) and perhaps others, Senator Muskie, therefore, included an amendment
in a contemporaneous water pollution act to remove water quality issues from the scope
of environmental issues that the AEC would need to examine. Id. The lead plaintiffs
lawyer in the Calvert litigation opposed this amendment and suggested that it would
offend environmentalists. Id. at 337. One aspect of Calvert Cliffs that Senator Baker
apparently never questioned was that NEPA entailed a balancing of environmental and
non-environmental values, and the only question was whether the underlying scientific
assessment of the impact on water quality had to be performed by the agency or EPA. Id.
Some commentators suggest that Judge Wright misunderstood the import of
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The AEC opted to comply with Judge Wright's sweeping decision
rather than take any appeal. Less than two months after the decision,
the AEC published revisions to its Appendix D regulations. 42 Congress
also responded by providing the AEC with the authority to issue tempo-
rary operating licensees upon expedited review procedures.' ,.
Judge Wright's interpretation of NEPA offered considerable
latitude for future courts to address the scope of the new Act. Indeed,
while the opinion required strict compliance with NEPA's procedures, it
also suggested and emphasized Congress's goal of environmental protec-
tion. In short, the opinion articulated NEPA's substantive command and
required an adequate balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental
values which the court further suggested might be judicially review-
able.'" John Holdren and Philip Herrera appropriately observed in a
1971 Sierra Club publication that
the court has defined procedures that NEPA imposes on all
federal agencies. Now there is ample opportunity for citi-
zens to combat power plants in a way which, while not
promoting a final solution, certainly helps protect the envi-
ronment. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Calvert
Cliffs decision is the suggestion that if a project's adverse
environmental effects outweigh its economic benefits, it
ought to be stopped. That conclusion, however, remains to
be tested in another case, maybe-why not?-somewhere in
the continuing litigation over Storm King.'"
How this invitation to afford the new Act a substantive aspect
became blunted by the Supreme Court is then the true story of NEPA's
devolution.
NEPA's § 104. See A. Dan Tarlock, Roger Tippy & Frances Enseki Francis, Environmental
Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV.
502, 535-36 (1972). For a general critique of the decision by the Chairman of the non-
governmental Atomic Safety Licensing Board at the time of the decision, see Arthur W.
Murphy, The National Environmental Policy Act and the Licensing Process:
Environmental Magna Carta or Agency Coup De Grace?, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 963 (1972).
142 Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,071, 18,072-76
(Sept. 9, 1971) (amended by Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, 36 Fed.
Reg. 19,158, 19,158-59 (Sept. 30, 1971)).
1 Frederick R. Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 299 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G.P. Guilbert eds., 1974).
l" See Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d 1109.
,
45 JOHN HOLDREN & PHILIP HERRERA, ENERGY: A CRISIS IN POWER 189-90 (1971).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S PATH TO PROCEDURE
While lower courts grappled with NEPA's implications, the
.Supreme Court adroitly avoided addressing fundamental questions about
the Act for several years. NEPA, instead, arose in the context of the
Court's consideration of the doctrines of standing and scope of judicial
review. Before the Court could even begin to interpret a new law, such
as NEPA, it had to first articulate the now accepted modem doctrines
that would allow parties to challenge agency decisions. To begin with, not
until 1970 did the Court abandon the "legal interest" test for standing,
and allow parties the ability to challenge agency actions if they could
establish an injury in fact that was "arguably within the zone of interest[
I" protected by the statutory provision at issue.146 Indeed, not until 1972
did the Court confirm that injury in fact could include non-economic
harm, such as environmental harm.147 Along with allowing citizens
access to the courthouse, the Court also had yet to address the role of
courts in reviewing agency decisions: would agencies need to issue
findings, would courts distinguish between a review of facts and law,
would courts permit discovery and conduct hearings? These issues and
more would all command courts' attention throughout the 1970s, as a
"new era in the history of the long and fruitful collaboration of adminis-
trative agencies and reviewing courts" emerged."4
The Court's first principal foray into an agency's treatment of the
environmental consequences of its action occurred in what has become
a seminal case in the development of administrative law-Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.149 "From 1941 until 1971, Supreme Court
law forbade courts" from examining "deciding officers to determine how
1' Ass'n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp Davis
noted that these two decisions, along with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) and Hardin
v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), liberalized the law of standing, although adding
that the Court left the law in "turmoil." Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of
Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450 (1970).
147 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Earlier lower court opinions had
sanctioned reliance on environmental harm. See Sam Kalen, Standing on its Last Legs:
Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental Cases, 13 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (1997).
" Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see Grant P.
Thompson, The Role of Courts, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 192 (Erica L. Dolgin &
Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974).
149 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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and why decisions were made."15 In presenting the compelling story of
Overton Park, Peter Strauss explains that the "Court's decision in
Overton Park marks the expansion of lawyers' targets from claims of
ultra vires action to assertions that a discretion decisionmakers pos-
sessed had not been reasonably exercised."' 5 ' Ultimately, the issue in
Overton Park, and throughout the rest of that decade, including how
cases involving NEPA would be treated, was how courts would review
alleged claims of agency noncompliance with the increasingly expanding
environmental programs.
A. Prelude: Overton Park
Overton Park involved the nation's rapidly expanding highway
system.'52 Responding in part to environmental concerns,' Congress
passed legislation, like the Department of Transportation Act, in response
to concerns about the nation's blossoming highway system, establishing
new procedures for any highway projects that might require the use of
public parks." 4 The role that this legislation would play surfaced soon
thereafter as Memphis and Tennessee State officials proceeded with their
controversial proposal to develop a highway through Overton Park, in
Memphis.'55 Although federal officials appeared more sensitive to-but
apparently not understanding of-the values of Overton Park than state
and local officials, those federal officials nevertheless concluded that the
highway could be constructed through the park.'56 In making their deci-
sion, however, they were undoubtedly influenced by political concerns and
failed to issue any written findings addressing the issues contained in §
4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act.'57 Section 4(f) provided that,
before the Secretary could approve a project that affects a park, she
would first need to determine that "(1) there is no feasible and prudent
150 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES: SUPPLEMENTING
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 316 (1976).
151 Peter L. Strauss, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe-Of Politics and Law,
Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 259, 308
(Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
152 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (W.D. Tenn.
1970).
"3WENNER, supra note 98, at 10.
'" Straus, supra note 151, at 274-78.
155 See id.
1
'6Id. at 294, 296-97.
157 See id.
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alternative to the use of such land, and.(2) such program includes all
possible planning to minimize harm to such park, recreational area,
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use."5 '
A group of dedicated citizens challenged the government's action in
federal court."9 This group sought to enjoin the Secretary of Transportation
from allowing any federal money to be used to help construct the proposed
expressway through Overton Park.'6 ° They claimed that the Secretary
had not acted in accordance with the highway act's procedures, and that
he acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that the route through
the park was the only feasible and prudent corridor.'6 ' On a motion for tem-
porary injunction filed by the plaintiffs and cross-motions submitted by
the defendants for dismissal and for summary judgment, the lower court
ruled in the government's favor. 62 It found that, on the procedural issues,
the government either had "substantially" complied with the requirements
or that any deviations from those requirements resulted in "harmless
error."6 ' It next concluded that section 4(f) did not require that the Secre-
tary make any finding or articulate its rationale for why no other feasible
and prudent alternative existed.' The court then added that it would be
impossible, based upon the affidavits submitted in the case, for it to con-
clude that the Secretary, in its exercise of discretion, had acted arbitrarily
when concluding that no feasible route existed.165 The Sixth Circuit af-
firmed the judgment,'66 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.'67
'5 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Section 138 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
contained the same language as § 4(f). 23 U.S.C. § 138 (2006).159 Overton Park, 309 F. Supp. at 1191.
"
6o Id. at 1191. Plaintiffs originally filed the lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, but the court transferred it to the Western District of Tennessee. Id.
16 1 Id.
162 Id. at 1195.
'
6 3 Id. at 1194.
164 Overton Park, 309 F. Supp. at 1194.
165 Id. at 1194-95.
'6 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1309 (6th Cir. 1970).
The court reviewed the lower court under a deferential standard, only examining
whether any genuine issue of material fact existed which would have precluded the
granting of summary judgment. Id. at 1310. The court agreed that the statute did not
require any specific findings by the statute, and that it lacked the authority to impose
any such requirement. Id. at 1311. The court also reviewed affidavits and documents in
the record, allegedly confirming that the Secretary had determined that no feasible route
existed. Id. at 1312. This review led the court to conclude that the Secretary acted in good
faith in making his determinations and, as such, it would be futile to hold a trial to decide
whether those determinations were arbitrary. Id. at 1314. Dissenting, Judge Celebrezze
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With NEPA in the background, the case presented the Court with
its first significant opportunity to address the judicial role in reviewing
governmental actions affecting the environment.168 Justice Marshall's
unanimous opinion in Overton Park reversing the lower court noted:
"[tihe growing public concern about the quality of our natural environ-
ment has prompted Congress in recent years to enact legislation de-
signed to curb the accelerating destruction of our country's natural
beauty."6 9 Another issue demanding the Court's attention was the
administrative record, and on what basis a court could assess whether
an agency head acted arbitrarily or capriciously, if no requirement exists
for a written record of decision articulating a basis for decision. v° The
Court articulated the proper role of the reviewing court: agency decisions
should be subject to a presumption of regularity, yet a court should
conduct a substantial inquiry, ensuring that the agency has acted within
the scope of its authority, has considered all the relevant factors and not
exhibited a clear error of judgment.' 7 ' "Although this inquiry into the
facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a
narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency."'72 This searching inquiry, the Court added, had to be
based on the whole administrative record, not on the post-hoc rational-
izations contained in litigation affidavits.7 3 In the final analysis, the
petitioners won a significant victory, even though not achieving a full
evidentiary hearing or the need for formal findings by the Secretary. 74
In the context of NEPA, and the requirement for an EIS or some
other environmental document, the lack of "findings" would not likely
occur too often in environmental cases. The question, instead, would be
twofold: first, would Overton's approach to judicial review set both the
questioned the court's standard of review and would have remanded the case back to the
trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1317.
167 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 400 U.S. 939 (1970).
16See Strauss, supra note 151.
169 Citizens to Protect Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404 (1971) (internal
footnote omitted). Justice Marshall invoked NEPA, the Environmental Education Act,
as well as the Environmental Quality Improvement Act. Id. at 404 n.1.
170 See Strauss, supra note 151.
171 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16.
172 Id. at 416.
173 Id. at 419. The Court referred to the need for a "plenary review" of the record by the
lower court. Id. at 420.
174 See Strauss, supra note 151, at 328-32. Ultimately, the State abandoned the proposed
project. Id.
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minimum and, under NEPA, the maximum authority for the scope of
judicial review; and second, how would Overton's emphasis on ensuring
that an agency adequately considered all the relevant factors and did not
act arbitrarily affect Calvert Cliffs' interpretation of NEPA?
B. The Court Meets NEPA: SCRAP I
Roughly three years after Congress passed NEPA, the Court
decided its first NEPA case.'75 Yet, as in Overton Park, the case did not
directly involve the underlying environmental issues, but instead, fo-
cused on emerging principles of administrative law. 7 ' While the law of
standing advanced favorably toward allowing citizen suits, NEPA suf-
fered its first significant defeat at the mantle of judicial review and
standing.'77 In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP) the Court held that law students and other environ-
mental groups challenging a rate increase by the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC") had standing to pursue their claim.7 ' The students
alleged that the proposed rate increase would promote the use of new
raw materials that compete with recycled materials or scrap.'79 The
increased need for raw materials would lead to increased mining, timber
harvesting, and other resource extracting activities.' 0 As a result,
SCRAP claimed, the ICC was required to comply with NEPA before it
could allow the increase to take effect.'18
Writing for a three-judge panel convened for such ICC proceed-
ings, Judge Skelly Wright began by observing that the case
presents important issues concerning the applicability of
[NEPA] . . . to agency rate making procedures. More
175 SCRAP I, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). The Court issues two rulings on injunctions that
mentioned NEPA prior to SCRAP I, but the court did not interpret NEPA in order to
reach its decisions. See Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917
(1971); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 409 U.S. 1207 (1972). Justice Douglas dissented from a denial for
certiorari and argued that the case needed to be decided as to NEPA's merits. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
176 See SCRAP I, 412 U.S. at 669.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 676.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 677.
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broadly, it tests once again our commitment to use all
practicable means and measures.., in a manner calcu-
lated to. .. create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.'82
Judge Wright granted the plaintiffs an injunction, limited to
enjoining any surcharge that would be imposed on recyclable materials
pending the completion of "an adequate environmental impact state-
ment." s3 Later in his opinion he referred to the agency's approach to
NEPA as a "ruse" or "glorified boilerplate," observing that the agency
routinely avoided NEPA by simply concluding that all of its actions did
not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and, as
such, no environmental document was necessary."
In responding to the suggestion that courts lacked the authority
to engage in judicial review of certain ICC decisions, Judge Wright
echoed the understanding of NEPA in Calvert Cliffs and Judge Friendly's
decision in City of New York v. United States. s5 Whether a court might
otherwise lack jurisdiction, NEPA nonetheless "implicitly confers author-
ity on the federal courts to enjoin any federal action taken in violation of
NEPA's procedural requirements."8 6 He described NEPA as imposing
"substantive duties," suggesting that he might not be able to reverse a
decision on the merits, under section 101 of the Act,
unless it be shown that the actual balance of costs and
benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave
182 Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (S.C.R.A.P.) v. United States,
346 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D.D.C. 1972) (internal citation omitted).
" Id. at 192. The ICC had subsequently issued a six page "draft environmental impact
statement," however as Judge Wright noted, it was not clear what action of the ICC the
draft intended to reference. Id. at 193-94. The document discussed the 2.5 percent
surcharge at issue, though it had already gone into effect. Id. at 194. The railroads
ultimately sought a long-term selective rate increase of 4.1 percent that was not
discussed in the document. Id. That draft document-"roundly condemned" by even the
CEQ and EPA-noted that there would be some impact on the environment, but added
that more information was needed. Id.184SCRAP, 346 F. Supp. at 200-201 and n.17.
1 Id. at 197 ("NEPA is a new and unusual statute imposing substantive duties which
overlie those imposed on an agency by the statute or statutes for which it has
jurisdictional responsibility."(quoting City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp.
150, 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1972))).
186/Id.
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insufficient weight to environmental values. But if the
decision was reached procedurally without individualized
consideration and balancing of environmental
factors--conducted fully and in good faith-it is the re-
sponsibility of the courts to reverse.
8 7
Although events marched forward while the case proceeded to the
high court, the two fundamental principles below became the focus of the
Court's attention: did the plaintiffs have standing and did the court have
jurisdiction over the ICC's order declining to suspend the proposed interim
rate increase."s The Court's recognition that the ICC's order likely had
environmental impacts is evident from Justice Stewart's opinion:
[Tihe challenged agency action in this case is applicable to
substantially all of the Nation's railroads, and thus alleg-
edly has an adverse environmental impact on all the natu-
ral resources of the country.... [Aill persons who utilize
the scenic resources of the country, and indeed all who
breathe its air, could claim harm similar to that alleged by
the environmental groups here.'89
Equally evident is that the United States evinced little concern for
those impacts, when in light of Judge Wright's opinion it nevertheless
argued that the Commission's decision under review did not necessarily
warrant the preparation of any NEPA document. 9 ° But the government's
principal argument on NEPA focused on arguing that § 15(7) of the
Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") precluded judicial review of the ICC's
orders declining to suspend rate increases, and further that the lower
court's conclusion that it could exercise jurisdiction over the agency's
decision to ensure NEPA compliance effected an implicit and impermissi-
ble amendment of the statutory preclusion of judicial review.'
187 Id. at 197-98 (internal citations omitted).
188 See SCRAP I, 412 U.S. at 669.
189 Id. at 687.
" Reply Brief for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission at 4 n.1,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973) (No. 72-535), 1973 WL 173827.
'
91 See id. at 20. In the final section of its brief, the United States also argued that NEPA
did not apply to suspension decisions. Id. at 36. Trying to fit the enormous amount of
work required for an EIS as sweeping as a rate increase into the thirty days of




After affirming that the petitioners had standing to pursue their
claims, the Court then turned its attention to the question of whether
NEPA could be enforced in this circumstance.'92 Here, writing for a
plurality of the Court on this issue, Justice Stewart accepted the Solicitor
General's argument that NEPA could not be read to repeal implicitly the
limitation on judicial review contained in § 15(7) of the ICA. 9 ' Although
noting NEPA's "lofty" purposes, Justice Stewart concluded that the Court
could not "agree with the District Court that NEPA has amended § 15(7)
sub silentio and created an implicit exception... so that judicial power
to grant injunctive relief in this case has been revived."'94 To support his
conclusion, Justice Stewart purportedly examined the legislative history
of NEPA and found nothing to suggest any intention to repeal § 15(7) of
the ICA, further observing that "[tihe statutory language, in fact, indi-
cates that NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication any other
statute."9 ' This conclusion parallels the argument raised by the Solicitor
General, who in the United States' brief made the unsubstantiated and
passing statement that "[there is nothing in NEPA or its legislative
history which even suggests that Congress contemplated that the very
general language of NEPA would confer a suspension power on the
courts which had previously been explicitly withdrawn by Congress." 9 6
According to Justice Stewart, nothing in the D.C. Circuit's opinion in
Calvert Cliffs suggested otherwise, as the court similarly observed that
repeals by implication are disfavored.' 97 In addition, the case did not
involve an explicit congressional decision to preclude the type of relief
[tihe detailed evaluation of benefits and costs required by NEPA is not
possible at the stage of the review of the lawfulness of proposed tariffs
under focus here. . . . [Suspension proceedings] are simply not
amenable to the careful balancing analysis mandated by NEPA.
Id. at 35-36.
'
92 SCRAP I, 412 U.S. at 690.
193 Id. at 690-91.
194 Id. at 692-93. Justice Stewart's record of deciding environmental cases is not easily
categorized; his votes appear more aligned on the basis of federalism principles than on
any pro or anti-environmental bias. See WENNER, supra note 98, at 159.
195 SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. at 694. Justice Stewart invoked the language in NEPA, which
requires that federal agencies review their statutory authorities and policies for
determining whether to recommend to Congress any needed changes to comply with
NEPA, to support his conclusion that NEPA did not implicitly repeal or amend existing
statutes. Id. at 694-95. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 4333) (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
" Reply Brief for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission at 22-23,
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S.
669 (1973), 1973 WL 173827.
197 SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. at 695-96.
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being sought in SCRAP 1.19 He further reasoned that, if NEPA were to
apply in this case, its application "would disturb [the] careful balance of
interests" established under § 15(7) of the ICA.'99
Dissenting to that part of Justice Stewart's opinion addressing
NEPA, Justice Douglas highlighted the serious environmental concerns
raised by the petitioners. He quoted a telling comment by Chairman
Train of CEQ about the importance of having the ICC assess environ-
mental impacts:
[Tihe Council feels that the basic environmental issues
related to the existing freight rate structure and changes
thereto, must be evaluated in a logical, analytical, and
timely fashion in compliance with the requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act. The Commission's
actions to date appear to be inconsistent with the objec-
tives of NEPA, and the analyses undertaken to date by the
Commission appear to offer an inadequate basis from
which to draw conclusions concerning the impact of freight
rates on recycling and environmental quality. °°
In further arguing that NEPA should apply to the ICC's action,
Justice Douglas warned that the Court "greatly weakens NEPA in a
crucially important segment of the federal environmental field," and that
the preclusion ofjudicial review only applied to instances where the ICC
had yet to act on a rate suspension. 2°1 Apparently concerned with a trend
that he undoubtedly foresaw and lamented, Justice Douglas quoted
recent articles by a former CEQ member, Robert Cahn, relating how
Congressman Dingell had witnessed federal agencies' reluctance to apply
198 Id.
... Id. at 697. Justice Stewart ended his analysis by quoting from the Second Circuit's
decision in Port of New York Authority v. United States. Id. at 697-98.
In Port of New York Authority, the court determined that Congress intended to
"vest in the Commission the sole and exclusive power to suspend and to withdraw from
the judiciary any pre-existing power to grant injunctive relief." 451 F.2d 783,788 (2d Cir.
1971) (internal citations omitted). And so, in response to the argument that an EIS had
to be prepared before any interim rate increase could be allowed, the court held that it
would defeat the purpose of NEPA, which requires a case-by-case, careful, and detailed
balancing, to apply the statute when such a detailed analysis could not be performed
within the requisite time period. Id. at 789-790. But, the court also added that it agreed
with the D.C. Circuit's decision in Calvert Cliffs, on the breadth and application of NEPA
in those instances where it applies. Id.
200 SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. at 707 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).2
"
1 Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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NEPA adequately." 2 Justice Douglas observed that "[t]hese cases are,
indeed, Exhibit A of the current practice of federal agencies to undermine
the policy announced by Congress in NEPA." °3
Justice Marshall, similarly objecting to the Court's treatment of
NEPA, attempted to assuage Douglas's concern. Although arguing that
the plurality wrongly held that the lower court lacked the power to issue
an injunction, Justice Marshall suggested the holding was narrow: "the
decision clearly concerns only the scope of remedies available to the
District Court in the context of a case of this particular character."2°4
Justice Marshall further noted that Justice Stewart neither addressed
the adequacy of NEPA compliance nor the proper scope of review." 5
The Court's first foray into the significance of NEPA, therefore,
arguably signaled a degree of uncertainty of how to marry new stand-
alone environmental programs, such as NEPA, with the host of existing
federal statutes and programs.
C. So We Meet Again: SCRAP II
The Court's next confrontation with NEPA occurred again in the
context of the SCRAP litigation before the ICC, in Aberdeen & Rockfish
R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP)-SCRAP 1.2 °6 A year after the Commission approved a tempo-
rary emergency surcharge of 2.5 cent, the railroads, filed for an average
four cent long-term rate increase on most of its commodities. °7 The Com-
mission responded by suspending for seven months-the maximum stat-
utory period-what otherwise would have been an automatic increase,
202 Id. at 714 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
203 Id.
2 4 Id. at 724 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One NEPA scholar
subsequently described the case as Justice Marshall had. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA
LAWAND LITIGATION § 5:09 (Clark Boardman Collaghan 1985 & Cumulative Supp. 1991)
("SCRAP I is best read as a case holding that a specific limitation in a federal statute
withdrawing the right to injunctive relief otherwise available in NEPA litigation is an
implied repeal of the power of the federal courts to grant that remedy.").
205 SCRAPI, 412 U.S. at 725-26 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206 Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289 (1975) [hereinafter SCRAP II]. The Court made mention ofNEPA
in three other cases prior to SCRAP H. Alyeska Pipline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975); Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble, 417 U.S. 1301 (1974); Life of
the Land v. Brinegar, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973) (mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
207 SCRAP H, 422 U.S. at 297.
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pending an investigation into the reasonableness of the rates. °5 SCRAP
I involved the temporary emergency surcharge, but SCRAP H focused on
the long-term rate increase. °9 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin this long-
term rate increase, prompting the Commission to suspend its approval
of such increases until it had completed its review of the environmental
effects.21 ° It was that decision that led the district court in SCRAP I to
conclude that any challenge to the long-term rate increase was not
ripe.21' On March 5, 1973, the Commission issued its draft EIS, with the
final draft issued two months later."2 That document concluded that the
increase would not have any significant adverse effects on the environ-
ment, and even if they did those effects would be justified to ensure a
healthy railroad system.13
The Commission did not use this staff prepared statement
and the critical comments on the draft statement to de-
velop a new opinion to supplant or even supplement its
October opinion. Instead the Commission merely ap-
pended a one-sentence order to the statement's back page
which adopted the entire statement as part of its prior
opinion on the rate increases... 214
The plaintiffs challenged this aspect of the Commission's decision
on the approval of the long-term rate increases.215 Once again, a three-
judge district court panel gathered, and Skelly Wright penned yet an-
other harsh criticism of the Commission's attitude toward NEPA.216 At
the outset, Judge Wright rejected the railroad's claim, over Judge
Flannery's dissent, 7 that the court could not even review the Commis-
sion's decisions under the ICA-and more particularly compliance with
208/id.
209 Compare supra note 183 with supra note 207.
21o SCRAP H, 422 U.S. at 297.
211 Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346
F. Supp. 189, 194 (D.D.C. 1972).212 Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP) v. Aberdeen & Rockfish
R.R. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 1974) [hereinafter SCRAP HD.D.C.].
213 id.
214 Id. at 1295.
215 Id. at 1298.
216 Id. at 1291, 1294.
217 Id. at 1311 (Flannery, J., dissenting).
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NEPA.21s Judge Wright reasoned that "[olur reliance on NEPA in finding
jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's admonition in
its SCRAP opinion that 'NEPA was not intended to repeal by implication
any other statute.'"
219
The court then observed that the agency failed to fulfill the
procedural aspect of NEPA.220 According to the court, the agency pre-
pared the environmental document post-hoc, with little effort to mean-
ingfully address any of environmental issues.221 "We perused the state-
ment carefully and cannot find that it presents such a full and good faith
consideration and balancing. This conclusion is not surprising given the
above-recounted history of the statement's post-decision preparation."222
The court, therefore, vacated the Commission's order and directed that
the agency reopen its proceedings for a "full consideration of the proposed
rate increases on recyclable commodities."22 The court also gave the
agency some explicit instructions on how to engage in its environmental
analysis, stating that "[aill the environmental effects must be balanced
against the costs, if any, to the national transportation policy of attempt-
ing to alleviate the effects by not increasing the rates."24 But this time
around, faced with the nuances of its authority regarding the propriety
of injunctive relief and what would be the need to inquire into the envi-
ronmental harm, the court refused to enjoin the railroads from collecting
the rate increments on recyclable materials.225
Justice White began the Supreme Court's opinion by dismissing
the notion that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the lower court's
decisions. The Court dismissed this argument, reasoning that the case
21 8 SCRAP II D.D.C., 371 F. Supp. at 1296.219 Id. at 1298 (citing SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. at 694).
220 Id. at 1299.
221 Id. at 1302 ("We find the Commission's failure to alter its draft impact statement in
response to three of the critical comments of other federal agencies particularly
troublesome.").
222 Id. at 1301-02. Judge Flannery reached the opposite conclusion, believing that the
Commission complied with NEPA. Id. at 1311. His reasons appear somewhat result-
driven. Id. at 1311-12.
22 SCRAP II D.D.C., 371 F. Supp. at 1306.
'Id. During the course of instructing the agency, the court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion
that they be afforded the opportunity to engage in cross-examination. Id. Here, although
the court indicated that an oral public hearing might be required, ratemaking constitutes
a form of rulemaking governed by § 553 of the APA and, as such, does not require an
opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 1306-07.22 5Id. at 1308-10.
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no longer involved enjoining any rate increase, nor had the lower court
delved into the substantive issues of whether the Commission adequately
226thbalanced environmental and non-environmental issues. As such, the
Court concluded that jurisdiction existed to review whether the Commis-
sion complied with the procedural obligations of NEPA.227
Nevertheless, Justice White found few faults with how the
Commission complied with NEPA. To begin with, he rejected the lower
court's concern with the timing of the Commission's EIS.22 A draft EIS
only had to be prepared once the Commission itself issued a proposal,
recommendation or report.229 According to Justice White, the agency took
its earliest relevant action when the Commission issued its report on,
October 4, 1972, in response to the new rate increase being proposed by
the railroads. 2 0 Although no EIS had been prepared by then, the Court
noted that environmental issues had been discussed during the hearing
and in written submissions, and the ICC had even ordered the railroads to
prepare and circulate their own impact statement.23' This led Justice White
to conclude that the Commission had "thoroughly complied" with NEPA.232
22 6 SCRAP 1, 422 U.S. at 307-08.
227 Id. at 319. The Court reconciled its holding with SCRAP I and argued that the holding
was not inconsistent with its earlier decision, but only asserted that NEPA creates a
"procedural obligation on Government agencies to give written consideration of
environmental issues in connection with certain major federal actions." Id. The Court
continued by arguing thatjudicial review allows the Court to review these considerations
for adequacy, even if the other aspects of the rate increase are not ripe. Id.228 Id. at 319-20.
229 Id. at 320.
230 SCRAP 11, 422 U.S. at 320-21.
23
' Id. at 321.
232 Id. He added that the ICC cured any lingering concerns regarding the timing of NEPA
compliance by the subsequently prepared March 1973 draft EIS, which Justice White
concluded adequately addressed the environmental effects ofthe particular rate increase,
reasoning that "no purpose could have been served by ordering it to thoroughly explore
the question in the confined and inappropriate context of a railroad proposal for a general
rate increase when it was already doing so in a more appropriate proceeding." Id. at 325.
This approach arguably conflicted with some lower court opinions requiring strict
procedural compliance. Compare id. with Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (W.D.
Wash. 1972); Morningside-Lenox Park Ass'n v. Volpe, 334 F. Supp. 132, 139-43 (N.D. Ga.
1971); and Envtl. Def. Fund v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 740 (E.D.
Ark. 1971).
The railroads advanced the argument that NEPA requires an agency to engage
in a "hard look", but after doing so the statute they argued does not command any
particular outcome or require anything more of the agency. Brief for the Aberdeen and
Rockfish R.R. Co. passim, SCRAPII, 422 U.S. 289 (No. 73-1966), 1974 WL 187591. They
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Once again, though under the mantle of judicial review instead
of standing, the Court arguably diminished NEPA while simultaneously
allowing a case to proceed in the courts. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a
more callous treatment of NEPA. The agency had made up its mind
before the draft EIS was circulated, a chorus of federal agencies dis-
agreed with the agency's analysis, the agency never corrected the draft
EIS, and then the agency simply "appended a one-sentence order to the
statement's back page which adopted the entire statement as part of its
prior opinion on the rate increases."233
Dissenting from the Court's treatment of NEPA, Justice Douglas
emphasized that the EPA, CEQ, the Department of Commerce and the
General Services Administration all expressed concerns with the
agency's draft EIS, concerns which the agency never addressed. 34
Douglas also observed that "[tihe Court implicitly concedes the short-
comings of the Commission's analysis, relying, as the Commission did,
on the prospect that the environmental issues would receive further
study.. ." in the ongoing inquiry into the underlying rate structure.235
Such a deferral to a later date, Justice Douglas concluded, contradicts
the statute's requirement that environmental issues be considered
before the agency acts.236 Justice Douglas found particularly troubling
the fact that the agency had delayed its consideration for quite some
time, and even by the time of the Court's consideration of the matter
some two years later, nothing indicated that the agency had developed
its report or an indication of when it would develop its report.237 Ending
on a policy note, Justice Douglas admonished that "NEPA is more than
a technical statute of administrative procedure. It is a commitment to
the preservation of our natural environment. The statute's language
conveys the urgency of the task."238
further argued that, had Congress intended a more substantive role, then the legislative
history would reflect that fact, which they said it does not-albeit only citing to ten pages
of the history in a footnote. Id. at 35 n.40. The Court avoided offering any standard for
the scope of review, but twice referred to whether the agency had engaged in a "hard
look," and observed that under any standard the agency adequately addressed
environmental matters. SCRAP H, 422 U.S. 322-28.
233 See SCRAP II D.D.C., 371 F. Supp. at 1295.
234 SCRAP II, 422 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).235Id. at 330.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 330-31.
m Id. at 331.
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D. Narrowing Further: Kleppe v. Sierra Club
A year later, the Supreme Court issued yet another NEPA deci-
sion, this time in the context of the debate over national energy policy
and the development of federal coal reserves.23 s The Kleppe v. Sierra Club
decision is now remembered for the unexceptional proposition that NEPA
applies when an agency actually proposes an action.24° The case perhaps
more importantly continued the Court's march toward narrowing the
scope of the statute-with once again perfunctory analysis.241
By the early 1970s, the Department of the Interior's federal coal
leasing program was shrouded in controversy. Leasing of public coal
resources had been on an ad hoc basis, with little scrutiny.242 In 1971, the
Interior Department issued an informal moratorium on any new coal
leases or permits for prospecting for coal on the public lands until the
Department could develop a coherent approach to the leasing and devel-
opment of the nation's coal resources.243 The Department formalized this
moratorium in 1973, indicating that it would prepare a new federal coal
program and accompanying EIS.2" The Department released its final
EIS on the new national program in 1975, and in January of 1976 Secre-
tary Kleppe proposed the Energy Minerals Activity Recommendation
System ("EMARS). 245 At the same time, Secretary Kleppe also
announced that the Department would develop a programmatic EIS and,
among other things, create a Northern Great Plains Resource Pro-
gram.246 The Natural Resources Defense Council successfully challenged
the EIS on EMARS, claiming that the Department failed to address the
need for any additional federal coal leasing.
247
" See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1976).
24 Id. at 401-02.241 See DANIEL MANDELKER, NEPA LAND AND LITIGATION § 1:06 (Callaghan & Co. 1984)
(noting that Kleppe was the "first influential Supreme Court case" interpreting NEPA
and that the Court took a "restrictive view of the time at which an impact statement
must be prepared.... ."). But see Caldwell, supra note 8 (failing to mention Kleppe).
'
2 See John D. Leshy, Non-NEPA LegalAspects of Federal Coal Leasing and Development
Policy: An Environmental Attorney's Analysis, 9 NAT. REsouRCES LAW. 495, 496 (1976);
John L. Watson, The Federal Coal Follies-A New Program Ends (Begins) a Decade of
Anxiety??, 58 DENV. L.J. 65, 78 (1980).
Watson, supra note 242, at 78.
Prospecting Permits for Coal: Limitation of Issuance, 38 Fed. Reg. 4682,4682-83 (Feb.
20, 1973).
' Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 397-98.
2
" Id. at 397-98.
" Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 989-90 (D.D.C. 1977).
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These events surrounding the federal coal leasing program all
moved forward while a lawsuit proceeded apace. Filed in June of 1973,
a lawsuit challenged the Interior Department's failure to prepare a
regional environmental impact statement covering northeastern Wyo-
ming, eastern Montana, and the western parts of North and South
Dakota-the Northern Great Plains.2" Although the Interior Depart-
ment had agreed to prepare a national programmatic EIS, and it had
indicated that it would likely prepare site-specific EIS's for particular
leases, it rejected the notion that an EIS was required for a particular
region because it had not undertaken or proposed to undertake any
particular "plan" or "program" covering only that region.249 The district
court agreed, and declined to require the preparation of a separate EIS
for the Northern Great Plains region.'
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals thought otherwise, and
believed that the Interior Department would violate NEPA if it failed to
prepare an EIS and continued to "contemplate" federal action in the
Northern Great Plains Region.25 1 The government conceded that its EIS for
the national coal program did not address the cumulative impact of devel-
opment in the region."' Judge Bazelon explained how only through an EIS
focused on the region could the government adequately assess the cumula-
tive impact of the multitude of activities occurring in the region. 3
Yet, the court issued an arguably narrow decision, noting the
importance of addressing cumulative impacts but without requiring an
EIS unless the government actually engages in some "regional" pro-
gram. 4 The record, according to Judge Wright, amply demonstrated that
the government had treated the Northern Great Plains as a distinct region
warranting a regional program, and that the federal agencies had even
developed interagency group to formulate a regional program.255 But while
that program raised questions about the cumulative impact of development
in the region, it did not "purport to provide answers to these problems." 6
Accordingly, NEPA did not necessarily dictate the development of a
' Sierra Club v. Morton, 421 F. Supp. 638, 640 (D.D.C. 1974) (mem.).
249Id. at 646.250 Id. at 646-47.
251 Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880-83 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (2-1 decision) (arguing
than an EIS was necessary, the court was ultimately unsure an EIS was definitely
required and remanded the issue to the lower courts).252 Id. at 872 n.23.
25 Id. at 877-78.
25 Id. at 875-76.
25
56 Id.
256 Id. at 877-78.
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comprehensive regional EIS.257 Instead, a court must assess whether the
government's contemplation of a regional program had ripened suffi-
ciently to progress beyond a "dream" stage, an assessment that first
should be addressed by the agency.25 The Department of the Interior, he
observed, could make that judgment when it issued its final interim
report on the Northern Great Plains region.259 The court ultimately
remanded the case, allowing the government to decide how to proceed,
but cautioning that whatever action the government took it would have
to ensure that it examined development activities comprehensively.2 °
In lieu of agreeing to make this judgement, the United States
sought to persuade the Supreme Court that the lower court had gone too
far. In its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the government presented the
following question:
whether, under [NEPAl, a court may intervene in [the
government's] decision-making process to require federal
agencies to engage, in addition, in "regional" planning and
to issue an additional impact, statement for a four-state
area so long as they continue "contemplating" private
applications, even though there neither is nor will be a
recommendation or report on a proposal for a major fed-
eral action with respect to that four-state area.26'
257 Morton, 514 F.2d at 879.
258 Id. Here Judge Wright noted that the record supported answering part of the inquiry
affirmatively. Judge Wright outlined the inquiry:
How likely is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that
occur? To what extent is meaningful information presently available on
the effects of implementation of the program, and of alternatives and
their effects? To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made
and options precluded as refinement of the proposal progresses? How
severe will be the environmental effects if the program is implemented?
Id. at 880 (adopting, with slight modifications, the factors identified in Scientists' Inst.
for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
259 Id. at 881-82.
260 Id.
261 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, Sierra Club v. Morton 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir.
1975), appealed sub nom., KIeppe, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (No. 75-552). Congress abolished
the AEC when it passed the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, transferring AEC's
licensing and regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-938,88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5801, 5841 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)). The actual petition for cert., though, was filed by
the Acting Secretary of the Interior, Kent Frizzell. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1,
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (No. 75-552).
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The government explained that it had rewritten its final EIS covering
the national coal program and that its Northern Great Plains Resources
Program concluded in 1975 (and terminated in January 1976), and it did
not provide any actual plan of development-instead, it was simply a
planning tool.262 Interior's principal concern was that if such a regional
EIS was required, then all individual leases and mining plans in the
region would be enjoined until the completion of that regional EIS.2" The
agency emphasized to the Court that requiring what it described as an
unnecessary EIS would further delay the program-possibly by at least
another three years.2
The parties ultimately pressed the Court to resolve a legal issue
divorced from events. 26 ' Respondents suggested that the only real issue
was whether the Northern Great Plains is a valid region for purposes of
preparing an EIS.2 6 In short, respondents argued that the only issue left
was the scope of the region for purposes of preparing an EIS.267 The legal
principle, then, had two parts: first, whether a comprehensive environ-
mental impact statement would be required "when a number of federal
actions are closely related," such that "the environmental impact and
effects of one of them cannot be analyzed without considering the impact
22 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 261, at 6.
261 Id. at 12-13. Interior added that it would, if appropriate, prepare EIS's for particular
leases and mining plans in the region, and any EIS's for 'successive leases or mining
plans will assess the cumulative effects of all coal mining within the area affected." Id.
at 23.2 6 4 Id. 12-13.
265 Leo M. Krulitz, Management of Federal Coal Resources, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
139, 177 (1979). As a former Solicitor of the Department, Krulitz explained that Interior
already had been engaged in various pieces of litigation and had decided to propose the
type of regional activity being argued about in Kleppe. Id.
2
. Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari at 42, Sierra Club v. Morton 514 F.2d 856
(D.C. Cir. 1975), appealed sub nom., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (No. 75-
552).261 Id. It appears that little more than principle seems to have been at stake. The Interior
Department's new national coal leasing proposal, proposed in 1975, generated
considerable controversy and was enjoined in 1977 in a separate lawsuit-due to lack of
adequate NEPA compliance. See Krulitz, supra note 265. Congress was not sitting idly
by, as it passed the three laws addressing the issue between 1976 and 1978. Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-554, 92 Stat. 2073 (1978) (codified at
30 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)); Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006)); Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (1976) (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1701 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
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and effects of other related actions."2 If so, the second question was
whether the circumstances surrounding activities in the Northern Great
Plains region presented such a situation.269
Justice Powell, writing for the majority, parsed the language of the
Act and concluded that an EIS was required only when there has been "a
report or recommendation on a proposal for a major federal action...,"
and no such report or recommendation existed here.2v0 The Court noted
268 Brief for Respondents on Writ of Certiorari, supra note 266, at 49. The brief expressed
concern that, absent a regional EIS, Interior would avoid addressing the cumulative
effect of coal development in the same geographic area, even though those activities were
related actions. Id. at 42.269 See id. A host of parties, including Congressman Dingell and national environmental
organizations ("NEOs") filed amicus briefs. Congressman Dingell focused on applying
NEPA earlier in an agency's decision-making process. Motion for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curia of John D. Dingell at 9-14, Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390
(No. 75-552), 1976 WL 181499. The NEOs' brief emphasized that NEPA should apply
when the agency has committed itself to study a region separately, and their focus was
on the failure of individual environmental reviews of projects to address cumulative
effects adequately. Brief for Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., et al as Amici Curiae in
Support of Affirmance at 13-25, Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390 (No. 75-552), 1976 WL 181498.
Twenty-two states also filed an amicus brief noting the importance of programmatic
impact statements addressing the cumulative effect of actions in a region. Brief of 22
Named States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents passim, Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390
(No. 75-552), 1976 WL 194215.270 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 399. The Kleppe oral argument occurred the day after the Court
heard argument in Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Hills, 426 U.S. 776 (1976)-another NEPA
case. The case involved the application of NEPA to the Department of Housing and
Urban Development's ("HUD's") receipt of a disclosure statement filed by private real
estate developers pursuant to the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. Id. at 780-
81. Congress designed the Act to protect against false and deceptive practices in the sale
of unimproved land. Id. at 778. HUD's review of these disclosure statements is minimal,
only reviewing for completeness. Id. at 781. Respondents alleged that HUD was required
to prepare an EIS before allowing the disclosure statement to become effective (unless
HUD concludes that the statements are incomplete, it becomes effective 30 days after
submission). Id. at 782. Flint Ridge and the United States argued that an EIS was not
required, because (1) allowing the disclosure statement to become effective was not a
major federal action, and (2) HUD is exempt from NEPA compliance because it would
conflict with the agency's mandatory statutory obligation under the Interstate Sales Act.
Id. at 786-87. The Court deftly avoided NEPA by holding that NEPA and the Interstate
Sales Act are in conflict, and that § 102 of NEPA could not be held to trump the agency's
underlying statute. Id. at 788-89. Today, such a circumstance would likely involve an
inquiry into the first question, whether HUD's receipt of a disclosure report constitutes
a discretionary federal action triggering NEPA. And it is because of this fact, when
coupled with the Court's apparent effort to avoid discussing NEPA too much while Kleppe
was pending, that warrants relegating Flint Ridge to this footnote.
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that the undisturbed finding of the district court was that the record
contained no evidence of any "proposal for an action of regional scope."271
Absent such a proposal, an EIS would be transformed into a generalized
study document, like the Northern Great Plains Resources Program,
rather than serve as a detailed statement outlining the alternatives and
effects of any proposed plan.272 Justice Powell rejected the D.C. Circuit's
factual assumption that the government had proposed some regional
action as a consequence of its "contemplation" of a regional development
plan or effort to control development in the region.273 In fact, he observed
that the oral argument confirmed that no such proposal for regional devel-
opment existed.274 The Court noted that respondents "have not attempted
to support" the D.C. Circuit's opinion.275 Justice Powell further rejected the
suggestion that NEPA could force planning in advance of any proposal, not-
ing that the statute clearly requires that an EIS need only be ready at the
time the agency makes its recommendation or report on a proposed federal
action.276 The respondents' approach would insert courts into the "day-to-
day decisionmaking process of the agencies, and would invite litigation."277
The Court then addressed respondents' claim that an EIS would
be warranted on a regional basis when a number of site-specific activities
are "intimately related."278 While Justice Powell agreed that a compre-
hensive EIS would be appropriate when several activities with "cumula-
tive or synergistic" impacts are being proposed in a region,279 he con-
cluded that the failure to prepare such an EIS would be determined by
asking whether the agency's failure to do so was arbitrary-a standard
Justice Powell indicated respondents had accepted at oral argument.2"'
Because the record contained no evidence of arbitrary behavior by the
Interior Department, he rejected respondents' claim.28' In a footnote
271 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 400.
272 Id. at 402 ("There would be no factual predicate for the production of an environmental
impact statement of the type envisioned by NEPA.").
273 Id. at 403-04.
274 Id. at 404.
275 Id. at 408.
276 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 405-06.
277 Id. at 406.
278 Id. at 408.
279 Id. at 410. Later, the Court emphasized this point by observing "[clumulative
environmental impacts are, indeed, what require a comprehensive impact statement."Id.
at 413.28 0 Id. at 412.
281 Id.
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which contributes little to the reasoning of the case, Justice Powell
opined that the role of a court in assessing NEPA compliance is to ensure
that the agency has taken the requisite "hard look" at environmental
consequences, and not substitute its judgment for that of the agency.282
In hindsight, it is far from surprising that the Court held in favor
of the government and demanded that there be some actual "proposal"
for administrative action before NEPA would be triggered. The case
presented the Court with a choice: would NEPA be interpreted to require
that the government engage in early planning before even proposals are
sufficiently articulated or would it be cabined to require only the develop-
ment of an EIS once an agency has preliminarily made up its mind and
decided to recommend proceeding along a particular course of conduct?
The former approach would have required the Court to separate NEPA
from the APA-something it had shown it was unwilling to do. To force
planning, such as regional coal planning, would require answering what
"final agency action" under the APA, the court was reviewing, and the
notion that "inaction" could constitute "action" was not discussed.21 3 This
282 Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 n.21 (citing Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 453 F.2d 463, 481 (2d Cir. 1971) and Natural Res. Defense Council v. Morton,
458 F.2d 827,838 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The oral argument inKleppe is quite instructive. The
parties and the Court had a difficult time defining the "proposal" at issue, and the
question at one point became whether the government was controlling a number of
regional site-specific activities that had to be analyzed for their cumulative effect on the
region. And after questioning by the Court, respondent's counsel indicated that the
principal concern was that no cumulative effects analysis was being conducted on each
of these individual projects and a challenge to each of these projects individually for their
NEPA compliance was not as efficient as the present approach. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 14-25, 41-51, Kleppe, 427 U.S. 390 (No. 75-552).
' Arguably, this problem is implicit when the Court, expressing concern about the stage
at which a court appropriately enters the picture, argued that judicial intervention is
only warranted "when the report.., is made, and someone protests the absence or the
inadequacy of the [EISI." Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406 n.15. The Court characterized the
"decision" under review as "the decision of the petitioners not to prepare" a programmatic
regional EIS. Id. at 409. Interestingly, the issue that generated a dissent by Justice
Marshall, joined in by Justice Brennan, had little to do with any interpretation of NEPA,
but rather with the appropriateness of affording a remedy for a violation of the Act. Id.
at 415-23. Focusing on the remedy for a violation of an Act had been one of the driving
issues behind the Court's earlier interpretation of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). There, environmental
plaintiffs sought to persuade the Court that, once a violation of the ESA is identified, a
court could not determine whether to allow a clear violation of the ESA to occur. See Id.
at 166. The appropriate remedy for violations of environmental statutes had yet to
solidify. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) (addressing the court's




effectively meant that NEPA was about process married to the APA-a
result achieved without any meaningful review of NEPA's legislative
history, sparse on analysis, and devoid of any explanation of the effect
and role of Congress's declaration of national policy and directive to
federal agencies in § 101 of the Act.
E. Closing the Door on NEPA: Vermont Yankee
In Vermont Yankee, more than any other case, the Supreme Court
began to solidify the current view that NEPA is nothing more than a
procedural statute.2" The case involved two decisions of the D.C. Circuit,
collectively reviewing fifteen decisions, orders and promulgations of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.285 Several of the counsel who had ap-
peared before Judge Wright in Calvert Cliffs were once again in court.286
But this time the intersection of the APA and NEPA presented an insur-
mountable barrier. Both cases involved, in the words of D.C. Circuit Chief
Judge Bazelon, "the manner and extent to which information concerning
the environmental effects of radioactive wastes must be considered on the
public record in decisions to license nuclear reactors."28" A growing chorus
of commentators had been urging that NEPA demanded something
different than a conventional proceeding under the APA.2 as This approach
dovetailed with Judge Bazelon's belief that courts, under the APA, could
provide greater scrutiny of agency decisions and demand heightened
procedures if necessary to ensure a reasoned decision making process.289
84 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978)
[hereinafter Vermont Yankee]; WENNER, supra note 98, at 50.
265 See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 527.
Compare Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (1971), with Natural Res. Def. Council v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
[hereinafter NRDC], cert. granted sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 420 U.S. 1090 (1977), and Aeschliman v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. granted sub nom.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 420 U.S. 1090 (1977).
2, NRDC, 547 F.2d at 637.
m LYNTON K CALDWELL, LYNTON R. HAYES & ISABEL M. MAC WHIRTER, CITIZENS AND THE
ENvIRONMENT: CASE STUDIES IN POPuLARACTION xxii-v (Indiana University Press 1976).
" Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A Cautionary Tale of Judicial
Review and Nuclear Waste, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw STORIES 124, 126 (Peter L. Strauss
ed.,2006). Ronald Krotoszynski observed that "[bleginning in the 1970s, Judges David
Bazelon and Harold Leventhal engaged each other, and their colleagues on the D.C.
Circuit, in an extended debate about the proper scope and limits of judicial review of
agency action." Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "History Belongs to the Winners": The
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In the context of a nuclear licensing proceeding, this meant, at the very
least, a process designed to ensure a full consideration of nuclear fuel
processing and waste disposal.29 ° The environmental petitioners' claims
in Vermont Yankee were anything but extraordinary by today's standards,
and indeed the agency's approach toward NEPA in Vermont Yankee would
not likely survive judicial scrutiny today, yet when transformed into a
"procedural" issue under the APA, these claims became shrouded by the
Court's effort to limit what it perceived to be judicial activism.
In response to Calvert Cliffs,29' the AEC, whose functions were
subsequently transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
("NRC"), 292 published a notice that it was considering changes to its
Appendix D regulations addressing environmental effects associated with
the uranium fuel cycle.293 The agency noted that the issue of costs and
benefits associated with the uranium fuel cycle had been raised in a
number of individual licensing proceedings, but that it was not "clear"
how it could develop such an analysis in any individual case.294 Accord-
ingly, the AEC concluded that, "if [such issues] are to be considered at all,
[they would need to] be considered in a generic fashion through the rule-
making process. " "' This led to the development of the "Environmental
Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" document-a report that the agency
indicated was available for review and comment.29" The AEC afforded an
opportunity to participate in an informal hearing held six weeks later,
and told parties that the hearing would be a "legislative-type hearing" and
part of a rulemaking, "rather than an adjudicatory proceeding."297 Two
years later, the AEC finalized its rulemaking, noting that it considered only
Bazelon-Leventhal Debate and the Continuing Relevance of the Process/Substance
Dichotomy in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 999 (2006).290 See generally David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology through the Legal Process, 62
CoRNELL L. REV. 817,822 n. 19 (1977) (discussing the need for an administrative decision
making process "that assures a reasoned decision that can be held up to the scrutiny of
the scientific community and the public." (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976))).
291 See Calvert Cliffs, 449 U.S. 1109; supra Part III.
292 The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 transferred the AEC's licensing and regulatory
functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-938, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801, 5841 (2006)).
" Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 37 Fed. Reg. 24,191 (Nov. 15, 1972)
(codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).
2Id. at 24,192.
295 Id.
2Id. at 24,193.297 Id.
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two options for addressing the uranium fuel cycle: (1) either not including
any consideration of costs and benefits during an individual licensing
decision or, (2) in a licensing proceeding, factoring into the individual cost-
benefit analysis "the environmental effect associated with the uranium
fuel cycle, albeit small... in the form of numerical values."298 Although
it adopted the latter approach, the AEC nonetheless cautioned that the
Environmental Survey report was not an alternatives analysis but only
a primary database for the proposed amendment to its regulations, and
that further environmental impact statements were being prepared.299
In adopting its rule, the AEC dismissed several arguments about
the adequacy of its new procedures. To begin with, it rejected the com-
plaint that the hearing on the rule did not include a right to engage in
discovery and cross-examination."' ° Next, the AEC dismissed the sugges-
tion that it had not adequately explored the risks of terrorism or acci-
dents by noting that the Environmental Survey report was limited to
light-water-power reactors and not high-level waste disposal, such as
those utilizing recycled plutonium fuel, and observing that the report had
examined a few "postulated" accidents.30 ' The AEC similarly rejected
other claims on the basis of its belief that the environmental effects of
the uranium fuel cycle are insignificant-albeit based upon a document,
the report, that the agency itself admitted was not a NEPA document.0 2
This belief led the AEC to conclude that issues associated with the long-
term environmental effects of waste storage and disposal could be ad-
dressed later, perhaps in connection with an environmental impact
statement on high-level waste storage.33 Additionally, AEC's assumption
led it to conclude that any pending licensing proceedings need not incor-
porate these changes into either an applicant's environmental report or
any already circulated draft environmental impact statement.
30 4
298 Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188, 14,188 (April
22, 1974) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 50).219 Id. The AEC emphasized that it did not need to develop an EIS at this time, because
the purpose of the proceeding was to determine what factors of an EIS are required by
NEPA and not to perform an in-depth review of the uranium fuel cycle. Id.; see also id.
at 14,191 (stating that the Environmental Survey is not an EIS and does not require
further discussion that would only be appropriate in individual licensing actions).
'oo Id. at 14,189.
301 Id.
302 Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. at 14,189; see supra
note 299 and accompanying text.
303 Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. at 14,190.304 Id. at 14,190-91.
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The agency's unique response to the concern over nuclear waste
storage and disposal made the environmental groups' NEPA challenge
unnecessarily appear as an APA issue. In an individual, adjudicatory
licensing proceeding, where the agency otherwise allowed discovery and
cross-examination, the agency removed from those proceedings the issue
of nuclear waste disposal and storage, indicating instead that it would
address those issues in generic rulemaking.3°5 And yet, while such a
bifurcation of environmental issues under NEPA would be highly suspect
today, it, more importantly at the time, meant that no NEPA document
would address the matter or include an alternatives analysis, and those
parties interested in exploring in depth nuclear waste storage and
processing in an individual licensing case might never get the chance.0 6
This catch-22 occurred because no EIS had been prepared in the generic
rulemaking proceeding and the parties were not afforded an opportunity
to engage in any meaningful examination of the Environmental Survey
report that would be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis in any
future licensing proceeding.0 7 Moreover, the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists and various environmental organizations found the report problem-
atic.30 8 One might say that this was a well constructed Escher diagram,
from which those concerned with nuclear waste storage and disposal
would be forever trapped from questioning the agency's analysis.0 9
Indeed, Judge Bazelon understood that the argument was not an
abstract right to conduct discovery or cross-examination during a
rulemaking when he penned the D.C. Circuit's NRDC opinion.310 Rather,
he framed the court's analysis around whether the agency had suffi-
ciently ventilated the high-level nuclear waste storage problem.31' He
305 Uranium Fuel Cycle Impacts from Spent Fuel Reprocessing and Radioactive Waste
Management, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,987, 26,988 (May 26, 1977) (codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 51);
Roger C. Cramton, A Comment on Trial Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting,
58 VA. L. REV. 585, 598 (1972).
306 See O'Reilly v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 477 F.3d 225, 235-38 (5th Cir.
2007) (discussing impermissible segmentation of agency decisions); Stewart Park &
Reserve Coal., Inc. v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing avoiding NEPA
compliance through impermissible segmentation of actions); Scope, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25
(2008).
307 See supra notes 294-97 and accompanying text.
3 NRDC, 547 F.2d at 637 n.2.
0 Others at the time suggested that such generic rulemakings might be necessary to
avoid the cumbersome and inefficient process that had emerged for the licensing of
nuclear facilities. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 305, at 597-99.310 NRDC, 547 F.2d at 643 n.25.
311 Id. at 643-44.
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noted that the public interest intervenors, for instance, specifically
disclaimed any general right to discovery or cross-examination, arguing
instead the rulemaking relied solely on a perfunctory assurance by one
expert and did not address the waste problem in any meaningful man-
ner.312 As such, the procedures employed by the agency did not suffi-
ciently ventilate an important environmental concern.313 This expert's
analysis was incorporated into the agency's "Environmental Survey"
report toward the end of the process.314 It also appeared contrary to the
growing scientific commentary cautioning the country about the nuclear
waste disposal problem.31 5 Also, while the rulemaking process included
a public hearing and an opportunity for the hearing board to question
people, the board only questioned intervenor's expert witnesses and not
this expert.31 6 Intervenors were not permitted to delve into this expert's
conclusions when he finished testifying.3"' When the Commission issued
its rulemaking, it "summarily" disposed of any concerns about waste
disposal without responding to any of the other specific concerns.3"'
Based on this, Judge Bazelon explored the role of the court when
reviewing an agency's decision to curtail any meaningful consideration
of, in hindsight, an unquestioningly important environmental issue.319
The court emphasized that the procedures an agency employs are less
important than simply ensuring that all appropriate issues are suffi-
ciently explored.320 Here, the court found such exploration by the agency
utterly lacking.32" ' The AEC had not engaged in reasoned decisionmaking
because it made no probing inquiry into the waste disposal problem, even
when confronted with a bevy of criticisms.322 Having reached that conclu-
sion, Judge Bazelon declined to direct what process the agency should
use to ensure a genuine consideration of the issues, only suggesting that
312 Id. at 643 n.25.
313 Id. at 651. The court would describe this person's "boilerplate" analysis, with no
citations to studies, which recommended federal interim and then long-term
"repositories" as opposed to the agency's prior approach of burying wastes inside
abandoned salt mines, as "vague," containing "conclusory reassurances" or "unadorned
conclusions." Id. at 645, 647-50.314 Id. at 647.
315 NRDC, 547 F.2d at 650-52 nn. 51-52.
116 Id. at 643, 651.
317 Id. at 651.
'
18 Id. at 652.319 Id. at 644.320 id.
321 NRDC, 547 F.2d at 653.
322 id.
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various "devices ... [might] flesh out the record."323 The ultimate goal
was to ensure a fully developed factual record.324
In Aeschliman, the court examined the Consumer Power's Mid-
land, Michigan nuclear facility licensing proceeding and held that the
agency had neither adequately considered the alternative of energy
conservation in its EIS, nor fully addressed concerns with an independ-
ent safety report.325 First, the court held that energy conservation was a
"colorable" alternative that warranted some preliminary investigation by
the agency, regardless of any comments by the intervenors. 326 The agency
needed, at the very least, to provide some explanation for why further
consideration of any such alternative might not be reasonable if absent
from the EIS.127 Next, the court responded to the claim that the agency
should have allowed greater inquiry into a five page report on the safety
of the facility prepared by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards.3 21 Opponents of the facility presented 337 interrogatories, docu-
ment production requests, subpoenas, as well as requests for depositions
of the members of this independent board.329 Judge Bazelon concluded
that the agency legitimately denied some discovery requests. 330 The
categorical denials, though, amounted to a failure to clarify the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards' report.33'
That the APA, rather than NEPA, would occupy center stage as
the cases progressed to the Supreme Court and appeared virtually pre-
ordained in light of Judge Bazelon's separate opinion responding to
Judge Tamm's concurrence in NRDC. Judge Tamm agreed with court's
conclusion reaffirming the purposes and goals of NEPA and the court's
323 Id. at 653.
324 Id. at 654.325Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622,629-32 (D.C. Cir.
1976).326 Id. at 628-29.
327 Id. at 628-30.
31 Id. at 630. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety is an independent group
charged by Congress with reviewing each application for a construction permit or an
operating license. Id.
329 Id.
3 0 Aeschliman, 547 F.2d at 630-31.
33'Id. at 631 ("the [report] should have provided a short explanation, understandable to
a laymen, of the additional matters of concern to the committee, and a cross-reference to
the previous reports in which those problems, and the measures proposed to solve them,
were developed in more detail.").
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earlier decision in Calvert Cliffs.332 He disagreed, however, with the
court's suggestion that, under the APA, some hybrid rulemaking process
could be required.333 Judge Bazelon responded with a separate opinion,
advocating the utility of allowing a court, under the APA, to require
enhanced--or hybrid-procedural requirements.334 He only mentioned
NEPA once in this separate opinion, and even then only in a footnote
without discussion.33s
Judge Bazelon's choice to use Vermont Yankee as a forum for
advocating his approach to judicial review under the APA ultimately
proved troublesome for strong advocates of NEPA. In writing for a 7-0
majority,336 then Justice Rehnquist curtailed Judge Bazelon's paradigm
for APA judicial review. The Court signaled early that this would be an
APA rather than a NEPA case when it questioned why the rule had been
struck down, and then opined that it was likely "because of the perceived
inadequacies of the procedures." 337 Also, when rejecting NRDC's effort to
have the case dismissed as moot, the Court specifically addressed the
need for the Court to expound upon the role of the judiciary in reviewing
agency actions. 33' Not surprisingly, therefore, Justice Rehnquist began
his analysis with the "absolutely clear" prescription that agencies are
"free to fashion their own rules of procedure" unless otherwise constitu-
tionally constrained. 339 The Court briefly added that nothing in NEPA
permits a court to alter the "carefully constructed procedural specifica-
tions of the APA."
340
The Court's principal discussion of NEPA focused on Consumers
Power licensing of its Midland facility, and the lower court's decision that
the agency had failed to address adequately the alternative of energy
conservation. The Court dispatched this issue by holding that "the
concept of alternatives must be bounded by some notion of feasibility,"
332 NRDC, 547 F.2d at 658.
333 Id. at 658-59.334 Id. at 655-57.
335 Id. at 657 n.9.
336 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 523; see Metzger, supra note 289, at 158-61 (noting that
Justices Blackmun and Powell did not participate, that Justice Brennan apparently was
troubled by the decision and would not have granted certiorari, and that Justice Marshall
had some reservations).
33 Vermont Yankee, 535 U.S. at 541-42.
333 Id. at 535 n.14.
3 9 Id. at 543-44 (internal citation omitted).
340 Id. at 548 ("the only procedural requirements imposed by NEPA are those stated in
the plain language of the Act.") (citing Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 405-06)).
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and here the agency had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in requiring
that the project's opponents provide more than "cryptic and obscure
reference to matters that 'ought to be' considered."' 4 ' With Kleppe as the
only source, the Court added the broad statement-not necessarily even
relevant to the discussion-that "the role of a court in reviewing the suffi-
ciency of an agency's consideration of environmental factors is a limited
one, limited both by the time at which the decision was made and by the
statute mandating review. " 34' The agency contemporaneously decided in
another proceeding to include energy conservation as an alternative, there-
by making the Court's consideration of this issue largely academic.'
Yet, the Court illustrated its apparent lack of appreciation for
NEPA with unnecessary comments at the end of its opinion. In the last
paragraph of the opinion, the Court provides one "further observation."3'
Here, in dicta, the Court addressed the role of nuclear power and political
policy choices, and concluded that, while NEPA may set forth substantive
goals for this Nation, "its mandate to the agencies is essentially proce-
dural[:] [iut is to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision.... "3'
The Court, in short, accepted the petitioners' argument that the
principal issue was whether NEPA amended the APA by requiring that
agencies provide more than notice and comment proceedings under APA
§ 553.346 The Court simply never understood the other side's argument
about NEPA, perhaps in part because the NRDC had attempted to argue
that the rulemaking was not even an issue before the Court. 47 When
341 Id. at 551, 554.
342 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 555.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 557.3 5Id. at 558. Commentators also proffered opinions about the intended effect of Vermont
Yankee on policy issues. At the time, Stephen Breyer, now Justice Breyer, wrote that the
Court's decision "presented... [the issue of] the proper role of the courts in the debate
over nuclear power." Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in Nuclear
Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1978). As such, he advocated the need
to promote nuclear energy over coal-fired power, and that courts are ill-suited to engage
in the debate. Id. Richard Stewart, however, disagreed that the case involved the relative
worth of coal versus nuclear energy, suggesting instead that the issue is the need for
courts to engage in a "hard look" review. Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the
Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1811 (1978).
346 Transcript of Oral Arguments at 7, Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (Nos. 76-419,
76-528) ("To begin with, the Court of Appeals struck down an agency regulation on the
basis that the National Environmental Policy Act is to be construed as in effect amending
the [APA] ... ").
M47 Id. at 40-41 (arguing that only the licensing proceeding itself was before the Court).
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counsel for NRDC attempted to respond to questioning about whether
NEPA effectively required an adjudicatory hearing, he was never able to
finish his answer, although he clearly was beginning to explain that the
bifurcation of the issue between the licensing and rulemaking proceed-
ings effectively avoided the preparation of a NEPA document containing
a full analysis of the waste issue.3" Further, respondents never affirma-
tively argued, and readily conceded, that they were not suggesting that
the APA or NEPA required a hybrid-type rulemaking. In their brief, they
asserted that the agency simply failed to take the requisite "hard look"
at the environmental issues, and further suggested that the other parties
had raised a "straw-man" argument by seeking to convince the Court
that the issue involved whether additional procedures for rulemaking
beyond the APA were required.349 Only at the end of their brief did
NRDC suggest, generically, that the concept of hybrid rulemaking under
the APA, divorced from any NEPA discussion, might have some merit."'
In a decision that contained little analysis of what Congress
intended to achieve when it passed NEPA, and no assessment of the role
the Act would play in an agency's decision-making process, the Court
continued its trend of transforming the statute into a strictly procedural
mandate. It did this, unfortunately, with strikingly little fanfare or
analysis, as Thomas Schoenbaum notes, because of the bifurcation of the
issue between the adjudicatory and rulemaking processes.35' He correctly
observes that the agency had the flexibility to choose to proceed either by
adjudication or rulemaking, and in the adjudication, the nuclear fuel
cycle undoubtedly would have been fully ventilated as part of the EIS for
the facility." 2 Yet, once the agency removed that issue from the individual
licensing proceeding and shifted it over into its generic rulemaking process,
31 Id. at 47-49.
3
'
9 Brief for Respondents at 40-44, Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 519 (Nos. 76-419, 76-528),
1977 WL 205092. Elsewhere, NRDC distinguished NEPA from the APA and addressed
why NEPA might require some additional rulemaking procedures as a result of the hard
look doctrine, but, never elaborated on what it meant. Id. at 45-49. It would appear that
NRDC suggested that a typical APA review case affords considerable latitude and
discretion to an agency, while NEPA requires that the agency engage in a more-searching
inquiry into environmental matters before proceeding.
m Id. at 49-56.
351 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, A Preface to Three Foreign Views ofVermont Yankee, 55 TUL.
L. REv. 428, 430 (1981). William H. Rodgers, Jr., also noted that the Court's discussion
about NEPA's substantive goals occurred "[allmost in passing," and with no analysis.
William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L. J. 699, 709 (1979).
52 Schoenbaum, supra note 351, at 430-31.
2009] 539
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL*Y REV.
that opportunity became curtailed, unless the agency prepared an EIS for
the rulemaking.3' The agency specifically stated that it had not performed
any EIS or similar environmental document in the rulemaking pro-
cess-an obvious deficiency by today's standards.3" Unless one myopically
focuses on the APA and ignores NEPA, it seems hard to disagree with
Schoenbaum's conclusion that the Court erred by conflating the APA and
NEPA and overlooking the mandates of NEPA, all in an effort to ostensibly
rebuff the efforts of Chief Judge Bazelon.355
V. STRYCKER'S BAY & THE END OF A DECADE
If any doubt about substantive judicial review of agency decisions
under NEPA still existed after Vermont Yankee, such doubts were, in the
words of William Andreen, "laid . . . to rest" by the 1980 decision in
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen -- albeit in an opinion
that merits little adherence to stare decisis.357 Or, to put the matter more
bluntly, the Court in Strycker~s Bay "effectively squashed any possibility of
judicial enforcement of NEPA's substantial goals.""8 The case involved the
Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD")
353 Id.
31 Id. at 430. To the extent applicable, agencies must comply with NEPA when
rulemakings may constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. E.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat'l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1212-14 (9th Cir. 2008).
151 Schoenbaum, supra note 351, at 430. Arguably, this explains why one of the most
prominent administrative law scholars, Paul R. Verkuil, expressed some reservations.
See Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont
Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 424-26 (1981). For others who await another Vermont
Yankee, see Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 901 (2007), and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee
II, 57 ADMiN. L. REV. 669, 683-86 (2005); cf Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA,
The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345,356 (observing that the
D.C. Circuit's approach to the APA influenced the Court's decision to hear the case).
Interestingly, the environmental groups even differed among themselves about whether
the case was moot. See Reply of the Non-Federal Respondents in No. 76-528 to December
7, 1977 "Response of Consumers Power Company in No. 76-419," Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. 519 (Nos. 76-419, 76-528), 1977 WL 205090.
356 Andreen, supra note 8, at 243; Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd per
curiam sub nom., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
" Andreen, supra note 8, at 243-45.
3
' Lindstrom, supra note 16, at 260; see also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 277 (2003) ("In decisions that followed [Calvert
Cliffs, 427 U.S. 1109 and Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223], courts have gone to great lengths
to make clear that NEPA is a procedural rather than a substantive statute.").
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decision to proceed with the "selection of a housing site which could produce
adverse social environmental effects, including racial and economic concen-
tration," because of an asserted concern with the delay "in the construction
process" that would occur if a more appropriate site for affordable housing
were selected.359 In a short per curiam opinion, the Court, with Justice
Marshall dissenting, capped the coda of the first decade ofNEPA by empha-
sizing that the statute was nothing more than a procedural statute.
The case involved a classic zoning fight, with existing landowners
in a neighborhood attempting to stave off urban renewal and develop-
ment of affordable housing in the community. The urban renewal project
involved approximately twenty square blocks on the west side of
Manhattan, and included a considerable amount of low income housing
for those former area residents who had been displaced because of what
we today would call gentrification.3 0 A private school in the area and
some middle income residents raised a number of challenges to the City's
plan, expressing concern that, the proposed changes to the community
would deteriorate the neighborhood and make it a ghetto. 6' When
marshaling an array of claims against the City's effort, the plaintiffs
argued, in part, that HUD had failed to comply with NEPA before agree-
ing to fund public housing because HUD had prepared an environmental
clearance document concluding that the project did not significantly
affect the quality of the human environment.3 2 Plaintiffs asserted that
HUD needed to prepare an EIS focusing on the significant psychological
and social consequences of allowing low income housing.363 The district
court rejected this argument, concluding that such issues were not the
359 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3 0 Trinity Episcopal Sch. Corp. v. Romney, 387 F. Supp. 1044, 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). New
York City had announced its intention of providing affordable housing, at a time when
New York and other states were developing the concept of communities providing a
percentage of low-to-moderate income housing for the region. Id. at 1057; see also
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 716
(N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (proposing the idea that a development
"plan take into account... a fair share of the regional housing needs of low and moderate
income families .... ").3 61Romney, 387 F. Supp. at 1047, 1063, 1074. The private school would withdraw from
the litigation years before the Supreme Court decision. See Trinity Episcopal Sch. Corp.
v. Harris, 445 F. Supp. 204, 207 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).362 Romney, 387 F. Supp. at 1047, 1077.
" The plaintiffs argued that low income housing could cause the neighborhood to tip into
a ghetto, with increased occurrences of anti-social acts, and that regardless of the reality,
plaintiffs possessed a justifiable fear in the change of the community's character that
warranted examination under NEPA. Id. at 1077-78.
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focus of NEPA.364 The court also held that HUD legitimately relied upon
other agencies for information about the effects of the project, exercised
its own independent judgment, and that its environmental clearance
document"satisfactorily" covered the environmental and social factors.365
The court rejected plaintiffs' suggestion that HUD should have prepared
an alternatives analysis in its environmental document.366 With little
discussion, the court reasoned that NEPA did not require an examination
of alternatives outside an EIS.367
The district court's conclusion that an alternatives analysis is only
required in an EIS prompted the Second Circuit to reverse in part and
remand the case back to the lower court.368 The court held that NEPA
requires an examination of alternatives, even when the agency does not
prepare an EIS, and that HUD had acted inappropriately in simply
accepting the City's judgment that no alternatives existed.369 In remand-
ing the case, the court directed the lower court to fashion an appropriate
order requiring the consideration of reasonable alternatives. 3" The lower
court responded by enjoining construction on the site.37' HUD prepared
a new environmental compliance document, submitted it to the court
during the fall of 1977, and moved to dissolve the injunction and dismiss
the case. 2 The district court described this document as substantial,3
held that the government had complied with NEPA and the mandate of
the Second Circuit, and dismissed the complaint. 4
But when the Second Circuit reviewed the case again, its decision
sounded a decidedly different tone. The Second Circuit noted that the
City had apparently altered its proposed objectives and, in lieu of just
providing affordable housing and possibly dispersing low-income hous-
ing, the City had decided to concentrate all such housing in one low
income high rise apartment building on the site.375 While the City had
3" Id. at 1078-79 (stating that "community attitudes and fears" and "antisocial
propensities of low income persons" do not trigger a NEPA study).
365 Id. at 1081-83.
366 Id.
367 Id. at 1083.
3
' Trinity Episcopal Sch. Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1975).369 Id.
370 Id. at 92-95.
371 See Harris, 445 F. Supp. at 206, 208.
372 Id. at 208.
373 Id. at 209.374 Id. at 223.37 5Karlen, 590 F.2d at 42.
542 [Vol. 33:483
NEPA's DEVOLUTION
identified alternative sites, perhaps even superior from a social environ-
mental impact, those sites were deemed unacceptable by the City be-
cause transfer to any of those sites would further delay construction of
such housing." 6 In fact, HUD even criticized the City's conclusions about
the use of the site, but nevertheless proceeded with the project solely
because of the delay that would be occasioned by transferring the project
to another site.3" This led the court to note that the "HUD report reveals
many warning signals which must be considered in relation to the local
environment.... [The addition of the high-rise low income housing] in
an area already containing a high percentage of low-income housing..
. constitutes concentration[,] [contrary to] the integration contemplated
by NEPA." ' Further, HUD could not simply accept the City's choice for
solving its affordable housing problems, but instead had to exercise its
own independent judgment. 9 The court cited the Federal Fair Housing
Act and its own precedent to support HUD's exercise of its own judg-
ment.3"° Additionally, the court called on the language of NEPA § 102(1)
as a basis for HUD to exercise its own independent judgment.38 l Specifi-
cally, the court instructed that HUD "use all practicable means, consis-
tent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans . . . and resources to the end that the
Nation may . . . (1) fulfill the responsibilities for each generation as
trustee for the environment for succeeding generations."3"2 This arguably
unnecessary reference to § 102 of NEPA in the court's discussion of why
HUD's decision to reject other alternatives was contrary to congressional
housing policy would later trigger Supreme Court review.
The Supreme Court summarily reversed the lower court
opinion.383 In its short per curiam opinion, with only one paragraph of
analysis, the Court invoked Vermont Yankee and then quoted a phrase
from Kleppe that a court could not second-guess an agency's choice of
action.3' Dissenting, Justice Marshall suggested that the case was far
376 Id. at 42-43.
377 Id. at 44.
378 Id. at 43.
379 Id. at 44.
'8oId. at 44-45 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601,3608 (2006) and Otero v. New York City Housing
Authority, 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973)).
3 1 Karlen, 590 F.2d at 44.38 id.
' Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980).
'Id. at 227-28. The opinion contains no other analysis, other than a footnote responding
to Justice Marshall's dissent. Id. at 228 n.2.
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more complicated than the per curiami opinion indicated. 5 Justice
Marshall believed that the lower court effectively concluded that HUD
had acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and that it had failed to take the
requisite hard look at the consequences of its action."' He distinguished
Vermont Yankee as inapposite, and tasked reviewing courts, per Overton
Park, with conducting a "searching and careful" inquiry to protect
against unreasonable agency action.387 In its footnote responding to
Justice Marshall, the per curiam opinion merely suggested that perhaps
such a careful review would be appropriate if the issue were simply one
of arbitrary and capricious behavior, but such did not seem to be the
case, because apparently the lower court had not overturned the district
court's decision which supposedly concluded that HUD had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.8 8
The Court's perfunctory treatment of the lower court's opinion, as
well as NEPA and the APA, occurred in the context of a summary dispo-
sition, further prompting Justice Marshall in dissent to question the
Court's decision to avoid plenary review.8 9 Summary disposition allowed
the Court to decide a case based solely on the petition for writ of certio-
rari, with no further briefing or oral argument."' Later in his career,
Justice Marshall would lament the Court's treatment of cases like
Strycker's Bay, suggesting that the Court should not resolve cases by
summary disposition.39' Summary disposition, based on a "skeletal"
presentation of the issues does not afford the Court or the parties with
an adequate basis upon which to decide a matter.392 Strycker's Bay
evidenced the problems because the Petition for Writ of Certiorari con-
tained three questions and the entire argument section of the petition
mId. at 228 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
386 Id.
387 Id. at 229, 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 228 n.2. The footnote concludes as follows: "Instead, the appellate court required
HUD to elevate environmental concerns over other, admittedly legitimate,
considerations. Neither NEPA nor the APA provides any support for such a reordering
of priorities by a reviewing court." Id. For further discussion of this footnote, see
Andreen, supra note 8, at 244 n.276.
389 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Thurgood Marshall, Remarks at the Second Circuit Judicial Conference: The Problem
ofSummary Disposition in the Supreme Court September 9, 1982, reprinted in THURGOOD
MARSHALL: His SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND REMINISCENCES 190-
192 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001).391 Id.392 Id. at 192.
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only contained nine pages with little more than some block quotes from
a few cases.393 The first question asked whether the lower court violated
the APA and NEPA by "preempt[ing]" the agency's discretion. 94 The
Court eventually examined this question, and reversed the lower court's
judgment based on three pages of argument-most of which was a block
quote from .Overton Park and then a block quote from Kleppe.395 The
point of these two quotes was simply to argue that the APA established
the proper scope of review and that the lower court's opinion conflicted
with that standard of review.396
And so, once again, a concern about the appropriate scope of review
under the APA trumped any meaningful consideration of NEPA and led
to a decision that purported to announce an interpretation of a statute that
ten years earlier had been hailed as the environmental Magna Carta.
CONCLUSION
With the decision in Strycker's Bay closing the statute's first ten
years, and the number of petitions filed by environmental groups for writ
of certiorari in NEPA cases about to drop off precipitously,397 and with
the government having won all its NEPA cases, it is appealing yet too
cursory to suggest, as one commentator observed, that "[tihe Supreme
Court's entire record in the 1970s with regard to the environment was
primarily anti-environmental."39 It also is too simplistic to assume that
the Court ever fully addressed the scope of what Congress intended when
it passed the Act. Indeed, the cases, briefs and arguments to the Court
never fully addressed Congress's intent, other than to quote a few ex-
cerpts here and there from the legislative record.399 Nor was the Court
... Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, 17-26, Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (No.
79-168).
3
"Id. at 3. The other two questions were: (1) whether an alternatives analysis is required
when the agency does not prepare an EIS, and (2) "[w]hether social and psychological
factors, such as community opposition to public housing, are environmental factors
within the scope" of NEPA. Id.395 Id. at 17-19.
396 Id.
397 See Shilton, supra note 33, at 556 n.27.3 9 WENNER, supra note 98, at 151.39 Cf Brief for the Federal Respondents, Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. 535 (Nos. 76-619,76-
528), 77 WL 189463 (discussing NEPA's legislative history); Motion for Leave to File
BriefAmicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curia of John D. Dingell at 3-14, Kleppe, 427 U.S.
390 (No. 75-552), 1976 WL 181499 (discussing the Congressional intent behind NEPA).
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ever presented with any detailed analysis of how NEPA and the APA
ought to relate to one another. If we look at this first decade not through
hindsight, we can better appreciate that little about what Congress
intended in NEPA would be relevant to the Court's early concerns.
Congress passed NEPA at a time when several forces began
converging, and ultimately it would prove to be the APA that dominated.
To begin with, NEPA reflected the first wave of major environmental
legislation. Congress was defining new policies and goals for the adminis-
trative state, in broad and sweeping language.40 NEPA reflected broad
policies and mandates, not altogether different than what Congress did
in 1972 when it said that all waters of the United States would be
fishable and swimmable roughly within the next decade. 40 1 Also, Con-
gress began passing these laws before the doctrine of standing had
evolved and before principles of administrative law, such as the scope of
review, had yet to emerge.
NEPA, therefore, presented a blank canvass upon which the
agencies and courts could draw their own picture for how the statute
would be interpreted, applied, and enforced. One option would have
involved delving into the legislative history to understand Congress's
intent when, over the course of many years, it considered and finally
passed the Act. Aside from a few occasional quotes, and assumptions
about that history, the Court avoided engaging in any meaningful and
detailed analysis of the new statute. Another option would have been to
endorse the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Calvert Cliffs.
Instead, the Court focused on another emerging issue, the proper
role of courts when reviewing administrative actions under the APA. In
each case decided by the Court during the first decade of NEPA, that APA
focus dominated the Court's attention explicitly or implicitly. The APA
The one brief that examined the legislative history in more depth than others, was the
Brief for Federal Respondents in Vermont Yankee, although that brief appears overly
dogmatic and extreme and, as the Court would note, misrepresented some facts. Vermont
Yankee, 435 U.S. at 540 n.15.
4 See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, §§ 101, 106, 203,
80 Stat. 915, 915, 917, 918 (1966) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470a, 470f, 470k (2006));
Federal Water Project Recreation Act amending the Fish & Wildlife Service Coordination
Act of 1934, Pub. L. 89-72, § 7(b), 79 Stat. 213, 217 (1965) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-62
(2006)); Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), 80 Stat.
931,934 (1966) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)); Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. at 535 n.14, 540 n.15.
o Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86
Stat. 816, 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
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discussion effectively overshadowed any meaningful inquiry into whether
Congress intended to substantively alter agency decisions. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, with this background, that the Court in the 1980's parroted
its earlier holdings that NEPA is a procedural not a substantive statute.4
The emerging principles of the APA that had shaped or, perhaps to put it
differently, precipitated the devolution of NEPA into a procedural statute,
had already been solidified by the statute's decennial.
NEPA, however, remains relevant today, and it seems only fitting
that as the statute turns forty we revisit its vibrance and potential. Its
very language supports agency consideration of the environment's future
when assessing environmental impacts. The congressional history sup-
ports agency decisions deeply informed, if not governed, by the goal of envi-
ronmental sustainability. In light of NEPA's judicial history from its first
decade, citizens cannot force agencies to interpret the Act substantively.
Agencies themselves, though, still retain the ability to act, make rules,
and adjudicate with the ultimate goal of environmental sustainability.
An ecological crisis of greater urgency and magnitude 403 than that
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, threatens our oceans,4 °4 our freshwater
supplies,405 our dying species,4°6 and the sustainability of our ecosystems
because of greenhouse gas emissions. 4 ' Faced with all these challenges,
42 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989); Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97, 100-01 (1983).
0 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board reports that "[n]early two thirds of the
services provided by nature to humankind are found to be in decline worldwide."
MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT BD., LIVING BEYOND OUR MEANS: NATURAL ASSETS
AND HUMAN WELL BEING 5 (2005), available at http://www.millenniumassessment.org/
documents/document.429.aspx.pdf.
4 Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing Coastal and Ocean Ecosystem Services: The Paradox of
Scarcity for Marine Resources Commodities and the Potential Role of Lifestyle Value
Competition, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 355 (2007); Robin Craig, Climate Change,
Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825 (2008); Robin
Kundis Craig, A Public Health Approach to Sea-Level Rise, 15 WIDENER L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009).
405 See, e.g., CYNTHIA BARNETT, MIRAGE: FLORIDA AND THE VANISHING WATER OF THE
EASTERN U.S. (University of Michigan 2007).
406 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. MEYER, THE END OF THE WILD (The MIT Press 2006).
4
"
7 For just a few of the now prodigious number of books on this topic, see J.R. MCNEILL,
SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY WORLD 50-117 (W.W. Norton & Company 2000); PETER D. WARD, UNDER A
GREEN SKY: GLOBAL WARMING, THE MASS EXTINCTIONS OF THE PAST AND WHAT THEY CAN
TELL US ABOUT OUR FUTURE 131-40 (Collins 2007); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE
AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS
To SUSTAINABILITY 18-30 (Yale University Press 2008).
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we must ensure that our legal institutions are capable of responding in
an adept manner, and this may mean revisiting such weak precedents
as Stryker's Bay. NEPA has the potential to be used as a powerful tool to
help orient our government, and even .society, towards the goal of
sustainability. The fortieth anniversary of NEPA can rightly inspire
reflection on the history surrounding of one the earliest statutes designed
to help avert environmental crises.
